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PROLOGUE TO A VOLUNTARIST WAR
CONVENTION
Robert D. Sloane*
This Article attempts to identify and clarify what is genuinely new
about the “new paradigm” of armed conflict after the attacks of
September 11, 2001. Assuming that sound policy counsels treating
certain aspects of the global struggle against modern transnational
terrorist networks within the legal rubric of war, this Article
stresses that the principal challenge such networks pose is that they
require international humanitarian law, somewhat incongruously,
to graft conventions—in both the formal and informal senses of that
word—onto an unconventional form of organized violence. Furthermore, this process occurs in a context in which one diffuse
“party” to the conflict both (1) repudiates a predicate axiom of international humanitarian law and (2) exhibits an organizational
structure at odds with the one presupposed by the inherited conventions of war.
In particular, modern transnational terrorist networks, unlike most
nonstate actors of concern to international humanitarian law in the
past (including, for example, francs-tireurs, insurgents, and national liberation movements), characteristically repudiate the
conventional, “amoral” conception of noncombatant immunity and
the triad of core international humanitarian law principles—
necessity, proportionality, and distinction—that follow from it. Furthermore, the diffuse, decentralized structure of modern
transnational terrorist networks—in contradistinction to the hierarchical, linear structure of professional state armies and cognate
private armies of past eras—makes them ill-suited for compliance
with international humanitarian law. It also renders deterrence and
negotiation—the principal historical mechanisms by which states
neutralized threats from nonstate actors—frequently ineffective.
Coupled with the increasing availability of catastrophic weapons
on illicit markets, these features vastly complicate efforts to adapt
* Associate Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law. This Article is a revised
and expanded version of a talk given at the New England Journal of International and Comparative
Law’s February 23, 2007, symposium on “Modern Warfare: The Role of the Non-State Actor.” I owe
thanks to the organizers of that symposium and to Robert G. Bone, Daniela Caruso, Robert M.
Chesney, Anthony J. Colangelo, Kris Collins, Geoffrey S. Corn, F. Andrew Hessick III, Pnina Lahav,
Gary Lawson, David Lyons, Allan Macurdy, Daniel G. Partan, W. Michael Reisman, David Seipp,
Kenneth W. Simons, Andrew Willard, and David Wippman. I acknowledge with gratitude the excellent research assistance of Renan Beyati, Benjamin Brockman-Hawe, and Sepehr Shahshahani.
Errors are mine.
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the inherited war convention to contemporary circumstances—a
periodic ritual that has followed major wars and crises since the
advent of modern international humanitarian law in the nineteenth
century.
For these reasons, international humanitarian law must begin to
work out the contours of a voluntarist war convention to govern
what is likely to be a prolonged state of episodic armed conflict
with this particular genre of twenty-first-century nonstate actor. The
conventional regimes governing internal and international armed
conflicts should be augmented—but not, in my judgment, displaced—by conventions designed for what may be characterized as
transnational armed conflict. Several factors, however, counsel
Burkean caution and multilateral deliberation before introducing
innovations: the continuing vitality of certain instrumentalist rationales for international humanitarian law, its synergy with
international human rights law, and the manifest potential for
abuse. I therefore conclude that, in the meantime, (1) any proposed
modifications should be incremental, transparent, tentative, and
subject to revision as the genuine scope of military necessity becomes clear; (2) the burden of persuasion should be on those who
urge such modifications; and (3) insofar as existing law does not
clearly govern, sound policy rationales generally continue to commend adherence to the inherited conventions of war.
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Introduction
Until their first contact with Europeans in the 1940s, the Tsembaga, a
primitive society of about 200 people comprising one of a score of Maring
1
clans residing in the territory now known as New Guinea, engaged in two
stages of warfare. In the first, the “nothing fight,” belligerents lined up
“within easy bow shot” to fire arrows at one another while protecting them-

1.

Roy A. Rappaport, Pigs for the Ancestors 8–14 (1968).
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2

selves by huddling behind large shields. Because “the unfletched arrows of
3
the Maring seldom kill[ed],” neither clan sustained many casualties. Noth4
ing fights at times lasted for four or five days. They operated in practice “to
suppress rather than to encourage hostilities,” which could otherwise esca5
late into the far more brutal and protracted “true fight.” Nothing fights
generally ended “when both sides agree[d] that the number of deaths [wa]s
6
sufficient for the present.”
The point of this anthropological anecdote, and countless others that
could be told, is to emphasize a fact that is too easily lost in the labyrinth of
modern rules and regulations of the law of war: all war is, by definition, a
social phenomenon governed by conventions. Strange though it may seem,
What is war and what is not-war is in fact something that people decide
. . . . As both anthropological and historical accounts suggest, they can decide, and in a considerable variety of cultural settings they have decided,
that war is limited war—that is, they have built certain notions about who
can fight, what tactics are acceptable, when battle has to be broken off, and
7
what prerogatives go with victory into the idea of war itself.

The extensive codification and intricacy of the modern law of war tends
to obscure its conventional nature. In the lexicon of international law, as
8
well as ordinary speech, a convention often denotes a treaty. And conventions in this formal sense prescribe the bulk of the positive law of war. But a
convention also refers generally to a “practice or procedure widely observed
9
in a group, especially to facilitate social intercourse; custom.” For its efficacy, authority, and legitimacy, the contemporary law of war relies as much,
if not more, on this latter type of convention.
The term international humanitarian law (“IHL”), in contrast to older
appellations such as the law of armed conflict or the law of war, connotes a
shift in the emphasis of the modern “war convention.” By this, in the singular, I mean not only positive international law but the complete “set of
articulated norms, customs, professional codes, legal precepts, religious and
philosophical principles, and reciprocal arrangements that shape our judg10
ments of military conduct.” Broadly speaking, this shift has been from a
network of customary law and treaties—enforced by a variety of political
2.

Id. at 121.

3.

Id.

4.

Id. at 121–22.

5.

Id. at 123–25.

6. James G. Peoples, Individual or Group Advantage? A Reinterpretation of the Maring
Ritual Cycle, 23 Current Anthropology 291, 292 (1982); see also Rappaport, supra note 1, at
130.
7.

Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars 24–25 (3d ed. 2000) (emphasis added).

8. See The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 291 (William
Morris ed., 1975).
9.
10.

Id.
Walzer, supra note 7, at 44.

SLOANE FINAL REVIEW 7 MR.DOC

446

10/29/2007 4:09 PM

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 106:443

dynamics that obtain between the professional armies of nation-states, including reciprocity, reputation, and military discipline within a hierarchical
11
command structure —to an increasing reliance on norms of human dignity
and individual rights that IHL shares with and derives in part from interna12
tional human rights law. Hence, substantial authority suggests that modern
IHL now prohibits, for example, reprisals, which were once a lawful means
13
to enforce the laws of war.
Conventions need not be written, still less codified in any legally bind14
ing form. But just as a contract generally requires an exchange of promises
15
between two or more parties and a “meeting of the minds,” a convention
about the conduct of organized violence generally cannot survive or function very effectively as a unilateral commitment—or so it would seem at
first blush. In the context of modern IHL, however, this analogy is too simple and proves misleading, in part for the reason already suggested: informal
conventions, which cannot be understood as bilateral or contractual in any
straightforward sense, underwrite the formal conventions that prescribe the
bulk of the positive law of war. These two meanings of convention, as well
as their relationship to the modern war convention, broadly conceived,
should inform any effort to adapt the law of war to contemporary technological and geopolitical circumstances—a periodic ritual that has followed
major wars and crises since the advent of modern IHL in the nineteenth century.
Since the attacks of September 11, 2001, a fierce debate has raged over
whether it is accurate—or prudent (a distinct question)—to treat the global
struggle against modern transnational terrorist networks typified by alQaeda within the legal rubric of war or, by contrast, whether that struggle

11. See Adam Roberts & Richard Guelff, Introduction to Documents on the Laws of War
15 (Adam Roberts & Richard Guelff eds., 1982).
12. Prosecutor v. Kupreškić, Case No. IT-95-16-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 518–19 (Jan. 14, 2000). See
generally Theodor Meron, The Humanization of Humanitarian Law, 94 Am. J. Int’l L. 239 (2000).
Throughout this Article, I will generally use the expressions “law of armed conflict,” “jus in bello,”
“law of war,” and “international humanitarian law” interchangeably, although at times I will use one
appellation rather than another to stress relevant changes in the nature of this body of law since its
inception.
13. See Kupreškić, Case No. IT-95-16-T, ¶¶ 527–36; Transcript at 134, Prosecutor v. Martić,
Case No. IT-95-11-R61 (Mar. 8, 1996), 1996 WL 33657119 (asserting that customary international
law now prohibits reprisals in all armed conflicts).
14. Before the rise of the nation-state in Europe, codes of chivalry and shared cultural conceptions of the warrior’s honor restrained the means, methods, and targets of armed conflict. See,
e.g., Theodor Meron, Medieval and Renaissance Ordinances of War: Codifying Discipline and
Humanity, in War Crimes Law Comes of Age 1 (1998); Robert C. Stacey, The Age of Chivalry, in
The Laws of War 27 (Michael Howard et al. eds., 1994). Comparable codes and conventions
evolved in non-Western cultures. See, e.g., L.C. Green, The Contemporary Law of Armed Conflict 20–25 (2d ed. 2000); Arthur Nussbaum, A Concise History of the Law of Nations 10,
15 (1947); The Law Code of Manu 113 (Patrick Olivelle trans. 2004); 1 The Law of War 3
(Leon Friedman ed. 1972).
15. Anglo-American law recognizes certain forms of unilateral contracts. Restatement
(Second) of Contracts § 45 (1981); Kevin M. Teeven, A History of the Anglo-American
Common Law of Contract 77 (1990).
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must—or should—be treated exclusively within the rubric of criminal law.
Yet the distinction between terrorism as crime and terrorism as war is not
ultimately qualitative. It is, like the question of war itself, “something peo17
ple decide.” War has no Platonic form. To suggest that as a matter of
international law, a terrorist network by definition cannot be a party to an
18
armed conflict in the twenty-first century strikes me as both inaccurate and
19
anachronistic, although it would be equally implausible and ill-advised to
20
begin treating all or even most acts of terrorism within the rubric of war.
That is one reason why the phrase “global war on terrorism” is so unfor21
tunate : it crudely lumps together diverse phenomena within a single legal
framework, obscures relevant differences, and mistakenly implies that the

16. For a characteristic exchange illuminating the consequences of the debate, compare
Kenneth Roth, The Law of War in the War on Terror: Washington’s Abuse of “Enemy Combatants”,
Foreign Aff., Jan.–Feb. 2004, at 2, Ruth Wedgwood, Fighting a War under Its Rules, in Ruth
Wedgwood & Kenneth Roth, Combatants or Criminals?, Foreign Aff., May–June 2004, at 126.
See also William H. Taft, IV, War Not Crime, in The Torture Debate in America 223 (Karen J.
Greenberg ed., 2006); Rosa Ehrenreich Brooks, War Everywhere: Rights, National Security Law,
and the Law of Armed Conflict in the Age of Terror, 153 U. Pa. L. Rev. 675, 715–20 (2004) .
17.

Walzer, supra note 7, at 24.

18. E.g., Helen Duffy, The ‘War on Terror’ and the Framework of International
Law 249–54 (2005) (concluding that the conflict with al-Qaeda cannot be described legally as an
“armed conflict” for purposes of IHL because al-Qaeda lacks the traditional characteristics of either
a state or nonstate party to armed conflict); Michael Howard, What’s in a Name?: How to Fight
Terrorism, Foreign Aff., Jan.–Feb. 2002, at 8; Jordan J. Paust, War and Enemy Status After 9/11:
Attacks on the Laws of War, 28 Yale J. Int’l L. 325, 326–28 (2003).
19. I express no view here on whether the global war on terrorism constitutes a state of war
for purposes of U.S. constitutional law, cf. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 519–21 (2004) (eliding the question by focusing on the continuation of hostilities in Afghanistan), except to say that I
see no reason why the definition of war in Article I, Section 8, of the U.S. Constitution, and various
assertions of executive power under it, need be precisely coterminous with its definition in international law when it comes to assertions about the applicability vel non of IHL. The historical
meaning of war in the Constitution, for example, is clearly not equivalent to “armed conflict” under
Common Article 2 of the Geneva Conventions. Compare Campbell v. Clinton, 203 F.3d 19, 37–39
(D.C. Cir. 2000) (Tatel, J. concurring), with Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 2, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135. On the constitutional issue,
compare, for example, Bruce Ackerman, This Is Not a War, 113 Yale L.J. 1871 (2004), with Curtis
A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Congressional Authorization and the War on Terrorism, 118 Harv.
L. Rev. 2047 (2005).
20. “Although the policy decision to view the ‘war on terror’ as a literal war is legally plausible, the potential implications of this policy decision are staggering.” Brooks, supra note 16, at 719.
Such implications include vastly expanding the contingencies for the use of lethal force and obviating the criminal due process rights of those apprehended in such a “war.” Id. at 719–20; see also
Roth, supra note 16.
21. Or “global war on terror.” Because the Bush administration and others regard this as a
literal war rather than a metaphor, see Duffy, supra note 18, at 250 & n.175, the phrase “war on
terrorism” strikes me as preferable to “war on terror.” Terror, like fear, is an emotion, and “war on
terror” would seem to imply a rhetorical struggle, comparable to the “freedom from fear” included
in President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s “Four Freedoms” speech. See Franklin D. Roosevelt, President,
United States of America, The Annual Message to the Congress (Jan. 6, 1941), in 1940 The Public
Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt 663–72 (Samuel I. Rosenman ed., 1941).
Terrorism, by contrast, at least refers to a strategy or means of conducting war. For the sake of style
and convenience, I will hereinafter refer to the "global war on terrorism" without quotation marks.
But I stress that this and similar phrases tend, in my judgment, to be imprecise, unhelpful, and often
counterproductive from both a legal and a political perspective.
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military instrument should be the primary strategy to address the threats
22
posed by modern transnational terrorist networks typified by al-Qaeda. We
will surely lose the global war on terrorism if literal war becomes its strategic centerpiece; transnational cooperation in intelligence, financial controls,
law enforcement, diplomacy, and ideological strategies will be indispensable
23
to any ultimate “victory.” In the final analysis, however, defining the proper
characterization of and response to diverse kinds and degrees of terrorism
calls for policy judgments. While the use of force, as well as its conventions,
has been abused recently, the military instrument, too, has its place in addressing the threat of transnational terrorism. IHL must acknowledge this
24
reality and adapt to it.
*

*

*

*

On January 25, 2002, Alberto R. Gonzales, then counsel to the president, wrote that “the war against terrorism is a new kind of war”—as
distinct from “the traditional clash between nations adhering to the laws of
war”—and that “this new paradigm renders obsolete Geneva’s strict limitations on questioning of enemy prisoners and renders quaint some of its
25
provisions.” The phrase “new paradigm,” like the phrase “global war on
22. Cf. Samuel Scheffler, Is Terrorism Morally Distinctive?, 14 J. Pol. Phil. 1, 10–11
(2006) (“One of the many unsettling features of the Bush administration’s post-9/11 moral discourse, with its frequent references to ‘evildoers’ and ‘bad guys,’ is that it uses moral categories to
inhibit rather than to promote moral understanding.”). The U.S. House Armed Services Committee
recently proposed banishing the phrase “global war on terror” and similarly imprecise designations
from the 2008 defense budget. Rick Maze, No More GWOT, House Committee Decrees, Mil. Times,
Apr. 4, 2007, http://militarytimes.com/news/2007/04/military_gwot_democrats_070403w/ (last
visited Sept. 2, 2007).
23. See Nat’l Comm’n on Terrorist Attacks upon the U.S., The 9/11 Commission
Report 363–64 (2004) (embracing the propriety of the war label but stressing that “long-term success demands the use of all elements of national power: diplomacy, intelligence, covert action, law
enforcement, economic policy, foreign aid, public diplomacy, and homeland defense”) [hereinafter
9/11 Comm’n Report]; High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, A More Secure
World: Our Shared Responsibility, ¶ 148, U.N. Doc. A/59/565 (Dec. 2, 2004) [hereinafter HighLevel Panel, A More Secure World] (articulating the elements of a proposed “comprehensive strategy that incorporates but is broader than coercive measures” for addressing transnational terrorism).
See generally 1 Harold D. Lasswell & Myres S. McDougal, Jurisprudence for a Free Society 158–61 (1992) (articulating “the basic instruments of policy—diplomatic, ideological,
economic, and military” available to decision makers and recommending their “integrated employment” in international law).
24. See Brooks, supra note 16, at 761 (“Reinventing the law of armed conflict in the age of
terror will not be easy, but it is better to face the challenge directly than to pretend it does not exist.”). Even those who argue that terrorism cannot legally be deemed a form of armed conflict under
international law would surely prefer that, so long as states insist on treating it that way, they operate
under clear principles of IHL rather than in an alleged “no law” zone. Cf. Derek Jinks, The Applicability of the Geneva Conventions to the “Global War on Terrorism”, 46 Va. J. Int’l L. 165, 171
(2005) (“[O]pposition to the ‘war model’ is a bad reason to oppose application of the [Geneva]
Conventions.”).
25. “Decision Re Application of the Geneva Conventions on Prisoners of War to the Conflict
with Al-Qaeda and the Taliban” Memorandum from Alberto R. Gonzales, counsel to the president,
Office of Counsel to the President, to George W. Bush, president of the United States (Jan. 25,
2002), reprinted in The Torture Papers 118, 119 (Karen J. Greenberg & Joshua L. Dratel eds.)
(2005)[hereinafter Gonzales Memorandum]; see also Memorandum on Humane Treatment of
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terrorism,” is rhetorically dangerous insofar as it can be abused to justify
26
violations of clear law and to aggrandize political power. It also has troubling antecedents in the history of the law of war, which offer cautionary
27
lessons. During World War II, for example, General Wilhelm Keitel,
among other Nazi elites, described the conflict between Germany and the
Soviet Union, which Hitler labeled “Bolshevist terrorism,” in eerily similar
terms: as a new kind of ideological warfare that rendered the 1929 Geneva
28
Convention on the Treatment on Prisoners of War obsolete.
But here, as elsewhere in law, it is vital to differentiate between descriptive and normative claims. The existence of circumstances that may be
described as a new paradigm must be distinguished from policy measures
adopted in response to it—and certainly from its cynical exploitation as a
means to aggrandize power or justify expedient violations of clear law. We
may face a new paradigm, but the obsolescence of the inherited war convention does not necessarily follow: whether a new paradigm exists and
whether it renders the old one obsolete are analytically distinct questions.
I agree that certain aspects of the global war on terrorism, while hardly
without antecedents, can be characterized as a new paradigm if treated
within the rubric of armed conflict. (Whether it is prudent or wise to so
characterize them is a distinct question.) But what precisely does that mean?
Taliban and Al-Qaeda Detainees from George W. Bush, president of the United States, to Richard B.
Cheney, vice president of the United States, et al. (Feb. 7, 2002), reprinted in The Torture Papers,
supra, at 134.
Recent journalism establishes that David S. Addington, who at that time served as legal counsel to Vice President Richard B. Cheney, in fact wrote the Gonzales Memorandum. See Barton
Gellman & Jo Becker, A Different Understanding With the President, Wash. Post, June 24, 2007, at
A1 (“A White House lawyer with direct knowledge said Cheney’s lawyer, Addington, wrote the
memo.”). More generally, most of the memoranda that guided the key, controversial decisions made
by the Bush administration relative to the global war on terrorism were prepared principally by
David S. Addington, Timothy E. Flanigan, and John C. Yoo. See Barton Gellmen & Jo Becker, The
Unseen Path to Cruelty, Wash. Post June 25, 2007, at A1.
26. E.g., Geoffrey S. Corn, Filling the Void: Providing a Framework for the Legal Regulation
of the Military Component of the War on Terror Through Application of Basic Principles of the Law
of Armed Conflict, 12 ILSA J. Int’l & Comp. L. 481, 485 (2006) [hereinafter Corn, Filling the
Void] (“[Assertion of ‘new paradigm’] is a subterfuge for those who seek to dispense with the constraints that result from good faith application of [law-of-war] principles, and adopt an unlimited
definition of military necessity—an idea that was flatly rejected following the Second World War.”);
Joshua Dratel, The Curious Debate, in The Torture Debate in America, supra note 16, at 113
(critiquing the idea that the claim of a new paradigm excuses torture); see also Geoffrey S. Corn,
Hamdan, Lebanon, and the Regulation of Hostilities: The Need to Recognize a Hybrid Category of
Armed Conflict, 40 Vand. J. Transnat’l L. 295, 323 (2007) [hereinafter Corn, Regulation of Hostilities]. On rhetorical abuse of the “global war on terrorism,” see Richard Jackson, Security,
Democracy, and the Rhetoric of Counter-Terrorism, 1 Democracy & Security 147, 148 (2005)
(arguing, based on an empirical analysis of Bush administration speeches, that “[t]he language of
the ‘war on terrorism’ is not a neutral or objective reflection of policy debates and the realities of
terrorism and counter-terrorism,” but “a very carefully and deliberately constructed—but ultimately
artificial—discourse that was specifically designed to make the war seem reasonable, responsible,
and ‘good,’ as well as to silence any forms of knowledge or counter-argument that would challenge
the exercise of state power”). See generally Charlie Savage, Takeover: The Return of the
Imperial Presidency and the Subversion of American Democracy (2007).
27. See Scott Horton, Through a Mirror, Darkly: Applying the Geneva Conventions to “A
New Kind of Warfare”, in The Torture Debate in America, supra note 16, at 136.
28.

Id. at 136, 138–42.
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What is actually new about the new paradigm of armed conflict? Appreciating how a war waged against a modern transnational terrorist network such
as al-Qaeda differs from familiar international and internal paradigms is a
prologue—hence the title of this Article—to designing an appropriate, humane, and effective war convention to govern it.
At an abstract level, the principal challenge posed by the asserted new
paradigm is that it seems to call for IHL to graft conventions—in both the
formal and informal senses—on to an unconventional form of organized
violence in circumstances in which one “party” to the conflict repudiates
them. I put party in quotation marks because a diffuse, transnational terrorist
network, unlike a state or insurgent group, cannot accurately or profitably be
conceived as a monolithic party. This characteristically decentralized structure disrupts IHL. Modern transnational terrorist networks use organized
violence systematically. But they do not resemble professional state armies—or even past nonstate actors, such as militias, paramilitaries, and
insurgent groups—insofar as they lack, among other things, the hierarchical
structures of authority, discipline, and organization that characterize the lat29
ter. Without these structures, which can enforce the rules of war through
education, indoctrination, and a chain of command, it is doubtful that such
networks could, even if they wished, attain a general level of compliance
with IHL.
Repudiation of the inherited war convention by modern transnational
terrorist networks extends not just to particular formal conventions, such as
30
the treaties governing war on land, although it almost surely includes them.
More troublingly, it extends to the central informal conventions and social
norms that underlie modern IHL: first, that “the only legitimate object . . .
31
[of] war is to weaken the military force of the enemy,” and second, that
noncombatants should be protected from the harms of war to the greatest
32
extent compatible with military necessity. The network structure, as well as
the ideological or psychological predispositions of at least some members of
modern transnational terrorist networks, also renders them less susceptible

29. Rohan Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda 54 (2002). But cf. Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar,
The Untold Story of al Qaeda’s Administrative Law Dilemmas, 91 Minn. L. Rev. 1302, 1310 (2007)
(“[A]lthough circumstances have forced terrorist networks to adopt a measure of decentralization,
those networks have often sought to build administrative procedures and law-like hierarchical arrangements to strike a balance between flexibility and control and to mitigate the recurring
organizational problems associated with managing painfully scarce resources.”).
30. Cf. U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Comm’n on Human Rights, Final Report on
the Situation of Human Rights in Afghanistan Submitted by Mr. Choong-Hyun Paik, Special Rapporteur, in Accordance with Commission on Human Rights Resolution 1996/75, ¶ 31, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/1997/59 (Feb. 20, 1997) (quoting the attorney general of the Taliban to the effect that human
rights treaties and other conventions deemed to conflict with Islamic law would not be respected).
31. St. Petersburg Declaration Renouncing the Use, in Time of War, of Explosive Projectiles
Under 400 Grammes Weight, adopted Dec. 11, 1868 [hereinafter St. Petersburg Declaration], reprinted in 1 Am. J. Int’l L. 95 (Supp. 1907).
32. E.g., Dep’t of the Army, The Law of Land Warfare (Field Manual No. 27-10)
¶¶ 2–3 (1956).
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than past nonstate actors to the principal control strategies in the arsenals of
33
states: deterrence and negotiation.
For these reasons, the emergence of modern transnational terrorist networks, like previous developments that prompted revisions to the laws of
34
war, will require changes to the inherited war convention. But far more
than in the past, adapting the war convention to new circumstances will be a
unilateral exercise. By unilateral, I do not mean that it can or should be accomplished by one state. The unilateralism in the interpretation and
application of IHL that has characterized the Bush administration's approach
to the global war on terrorism is, in my judgment, often misguided and
counterproductive. Any effort to revise the inherited war convention should
surely be multilateral, for it will benefit from transnational cooperation between like-minded states. Unlike with past war conventions, however, only
one of the opposing parties to this war will determine its precepts. It will be
unilateral, roughly speaking, in the sense that a party enters into a unilateral
contract. That does not mean—any more than for a unilateral contract—that
a unilateral war convention is or should be nonbinding; nor does it imply
that no benefits accrue to the party that follows the convention. To avoid the
unintended and mostly negative connotations of the term unilateral, I will
refer instead, perhaps more precisely, to the need for IHL to develop a vol35
untarist war convention.
Part I of this Article appraises the inherited structure of the law of war
and stresses IHL’s traditional reliance on interstate political dynamics and
36
status categories. Part II reflects on the lessons of history and emphasizes
that, in certain significant respects, the allegedly new paradigm is not so
new: many of the debates about the global war on terrorism that rage today
were aired previously in the controversy over the merits and demerits of
37
Protocol I. Yet commentators have largely neglected this precedent in arguing about the appropriate military response to post-9/11 geopolitical
33. By mentioning “psychological predispositions,” I stress that I do not mean to say or
subscribe to the belief that terrorists are irrational or psychopathic. As one expert wrote, “Like many
myths, this one is easy to believe yet is almost always completely untrue.” Andrew Silke, Becoming
a Terrorist, in Terrorists, Victims and Society—Psychological Perspectives on Terrorism
and Its Consequences 29, 29 (Andrew Silke ed., 2003); see also John Horgan, The Search for the
Terrorist Personality, in Terrorists, Victims and Society, supra, at 3, 6; cf. Robert A. Pape,
Dying to Win 4 (2005) (arguing, based on a statistical analysis of suicide terrorism, that such attacks tend to be organized, not random, and directed at a particular strategic objective, most
commonly, “to compel modern democracies to withdraw military forces from territory that the
terrorists consider to be their homeland”).
34. See Hersh Lauterpacht, The Problem of the Revision of the Law of War, 29 Brit. Y.B.
Int’l L. 360 (1952); see also David Wippman, Introduction: Do New Wars Call for New Laws?, in
New Wars, New Laws? 1, 1–3 (David Wippman & Matthew Evangelista eds., 2005).
35.

I am grateful to David Lyons for this suggestion.

36. See Derek Jinks, The Declining Significance of POW Status, 45 Harv. Int’l L.J. 367
(2004) [hereinafter Jinks, Declining Significance]; Derek Jinks, Protective Parity and the Laws of
War, 79 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1493 (2004) [hereinafter Jinks, Protective Parity].
37. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3
[hereinafter Protocol I].
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circumstances. These debates included (1) Protocol I’s alleged legitimation
of terrorism, (2) its likely effect on the incentives of certain nonstate actors
and overall compliance with IHL, and (3) the normative and strategic advisability of conferring lawful combatant status on such actors. These debates
have not been resolved so much as obsolesced by time and three decades of
experience with Protocol I, but they offer lessons for contemporary efforts to
adapt IHL. Part III contrasts the paradigmatic nonstate actors of Protocol I
with modern transnational terrorist networks and clarifies two principal features of the latter that complicate efforts to adapt the inherited war
convention: their repudiation of the conventional conception of noncombatant immunity and their network structure.
Briefly, I argue that modern transnational terrorist networks with ideologies and structures typified by al-Qaeda cannot readily be integrated into the
global war system, created by and for states, or its associated war conven38
tion. This is because a sine qua non of the war convention is a particular
conception of noncombatant immunity and the triad of IHL principles—
39
necessity, proportionality, and distinction—that follow from it. But noncombatant immunity is not a principle of natural law. Nor, contrary to
popular belief, does it follow from the moral innocence of civilians relative
40
to the causes or harms of war. It is neither more nor less than a convention
41
in the informal sense, namely, a practice adopted by certain political communities to govern a particular (violent) form of social intercourse.
To say that noncombatant immunity does not follow logically from the
moral innocence of civilians is not to say that it lacks a moral purpose. To
the contrary, a paramount rationale for the convention of noncombatant immunity is that it reduces the aggregate human suffering and destruction
caused by war. But whatever its rationale, transnational terrorist networks
typified by al-Qaeda characteristically reject this particular convention of
war. The statements of Osama bin Laden and his deputies, for example,
suggest that they view noncombatant immunity as a defeasible principle that
can and should be discarded in circumstances where the enemy, in their perception, bears moral guilt for the grievances that constitute their casus
42
belli. This kind of moral conception of noncombatant immunity is directly
at odds with the conventional, “amoral” conception of noncombatant immunity at work in the war convention. It also conflicts with the axiom that
insists on the analytic independence of judgments of jus ad bellum, the law
38. See generally W. Michael Reisman, Private Armies in a Global War System: Prologue to
Decision, 14 Va. J. Int’l L. 1 (1973).
39. The principle of distinction, for example, which requires that soldiers distinguish between combatants and civilians, has long been recognized as indispensable to efforts to temper the
scope and brutality of war. Lester Nurick, The Distinction Between Combatant and Noncombatant
in the Law of War, 39 Am. J. Int’l L. 680, 680 (1945).
40.

See infra notes 149–151 and accompanying text.

41. George I. Mavrodes, Conventions and the Morality of War, in International Ethics 75
(Charles R. Beitz et al. eds., 1985).
42. See Michael Moss & Souad Mekhennet, The Guidebook For Taking A Life, N.Y. Times,
June 10, 2007, § 4, at 1; see also infra notes 159–160 and accompanying text.
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governing resort to war, and jus in bello, the law governing the conduct of
43
hostilities.
Repudiation of the conventional conception of noncombatant immunity
might not be such an intractable problem for IHL were it not for the increasing availability of catastrophic weapons to nonstate actors and two other
conspicuous characteristics of modern transnational terrorist networks. First,
unlike the state-sponsored terrorist groups that predominated in the twentieth century, modern transnational terrorist networks cannot easily be
44
deterred. Among other obstacles, they lack a readily ascertainable “return
45
address,” as the botched strikes in retaliation for the 1998 U.S. embassy
46
bombings attest. Second, again unlike state-sponsored terrorism, because
of their diffuse network structure and ideological views, modern terrorist
networks cannot readily be neutralized by negotiation. I do not mean to suggest that negotiation and deterrence, broadly conceived, will not work and
should be abandoned in the global war on terrorism: my point is only that
the conventional manifestations of those strategies will be inadequate relative to some of the most threatening terrorist networks that we confront
today.
International law must therefore begin to work out a voluntarist war
convention to govern what is likely to be a prolonged state of episodic
armed conflict with a particular genre of twenty-first-century nonstate actors: transnational terrorist networks typified by al-Qaeda. Al-Qaeda is the
paradigm, but not the sole manifestation, of a modern transnational terrorist
network: similar networks will likely continue to evolve and threaten world
47
public order. Several factors, however, counsel Burkean caution and multilateral deliberation before introducing innovations: the continuing vitality of
certain instrumentalist rationales for the inherited conventions of IHL, IHL’s
contemporary foundation in and synergy with shared norms of human
43. Ian Brownlie, International Law and the Use of Force by States 406–08
(1963); Yoram Dinstein, The Conduct of Hostilities under the Law of International
Armed Conflict 4–5 (2004).
44. Bruno S. Frey, Dealing with Terrorism—Stick or Carrot? 29 (2004); Robert A.
Pape, The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism, 97 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 343, 346 (2003). But see
Richard Matthew & George Shambaugh, The Limits of Terrorism: A Network Perspective, 7 Int’l
Stud. Rev. 617, 618 (2005) (“[A]lthough deterrence is not effective against an entire network, it
can be effectively used in a more targeted manner against nodes within a network.”); Robert F.
Trager & Dessislava P. Zagorcheva, Deterring Terrorism: It Can Be Done, Int’l Security, Winter
2005–06, at 87, 88.
45. Thomas Graham, Jr., National Self-Defense, International Law, and Weapons of Mass
Destruction, 4 Chi. J. Int’l L. 1, 9 (2003); see also W. Michael Reisman, Editorial Comment:
Assessing Claims to Revise the Laws of War, 97 Am. J. Int’l L. 82, 86 (2003) (“Nor can deterrence
operate without an address to deter.”).
46. See Michele L. Malvesti, Bombing bin Laden: Assessing the Effectiveness of Air Strikes
as a Counter-Terrorism Strategy, Fletcher F. World Aff., Winter/Spring 2002, at 17; Sean D.
Murphy, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International Law: Legal Regulation of Use of Force, 93 Am. J. Int’l L. 161 (1999).
47. High-Level Panel, A More Secure World, supra note 23, ¶ 146 (“Al-Qaida is the first
instance—not likely to be the last—of an armed non-State network with global reach and sophisticated capacity.”); Brooks, supra note 16, at 718; cf. Moisés Naím, Illicit: How Smugglers,
Traffickers, and Copycats are Hijacking the Global Economy 55–56 (2005).
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dignity and international human rights law, and the manifest potential for
abuse. I therefore conclude that, in the meantime, (1) any proposed modifications to IHL should be incremental, transparent, tentative, and subject to
revision as the genuine scope of military necessity becomes clear; (2) the
burden of persuasion should be on those who urge such modifications; and
(3) insofar as existing law does not clearly govern, strong policy rationales
nonetheless generally commend adherence to the core of the inherited war
convention. Its central precepts should be preserved, though for reasons partially distinct from their pedigree and rooted far less in a bilateral view of
reciprocity.
I. The Structure of the Inherited War Convention
Throughout history and across cultures, conventions of war have
48
evolved from and reflected some admixture of three principal rationales:
(1) military prudence, that is, issues of strategy, including an appreciation of
the value of internal discipline and reciprocity; (2) virtue ethics, that is, cul49
turally specific conceptions of the warrior’s honor; and (3) humanism, that
50
is, some conception of human dignity. With the rise of the modern state,
chivalry and noblesse oblige, which together animated the bulk of the me51
dieval jus in bello, gradually gave way to conventions operationalized
largely by the political dynamics between states. This is not to suggest that
humanitarian sensibilities played no role in the development of the laws of
war. Grotius devoted the third book of his magisterial De Jure Belli ac Pacis
52
to the concept of temperamenta belli, moderation in war, and the rhetoric
of modern IHL pervades the preambles to most of the treaties that estab53
lished the early laws of war. But law of war conventions of the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries unquestionably relied on interstate
political dynamics and incentive structures that obtained between the professional armies of states—and, by necessary implication, on a strict,

48.

See Green, supra note 14, at 20–25; Nussbaum, supra note 14, at 10, 15.

49.

See generally Michael Ignatieff, The Warrior’s Honor 109–64 (1998).

50. Cf. Myres S. McDougal & Florentino P. Feliciano, Law and Minimum World
Public Order 521–22, 522 n.1 (1961) (“[I]t is commonly stated in the learned literature that three
basic principles underlie the more detailed prescriptions of combatant law: the principle of military
necessity, the principle of humanity, and the principle of chivalry.”).
51. Stacey, supra note 14, at 29; see also James Turner Johnson, Just War and the Restraint
of War at xxiii, 128–29 (1981); G.I.A.D. Draper, Grotius’ Place in the Development of Legal Ideas
About War, in Hugo Grotius and International Relations 177, 184–85 (Hedley Bull et al.
eds., 1990).
52. 3 Hugo Grotius, The Rights of War and Peace (Richard Tuck ed., Liberty Fund
2005) (1625).
53. E.g., Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land pmbl., Oct. 18,
1907, 36 Stat. 2277, 1 Bevans 631 [hereinafter 1907 Hague Convention]; Convention With Respect
to the Laws and Customs of War on Land pmbl., Jul. 29, 1899, 32 Stat. 1803, 1 Bevans 247 [hereinafter 1899 Hague Convention]; St. Petersburg Declaration, supra note 31, pmbl.
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hierarchical system of internal discipline that states were to indoctrinate and
54
enforce within their armies.
Article I of the Hague Conventions of both 1899 and 1907, Respecting
the Laws and Customs of War on Land, requires states parties to “issue instructions to their armed land forces which shall be in conformity with
the . . . present Convention,” and Article II provides that the regulations set
55
forth only bind the states parties in wars between them. Furthermore, the
56
Hague Conventions apply only to certain nationals of the states parties,
namely, lawful combatants—a category first defined by criteria enumerated
57
in the 1874 Declaration of Brussels. The Brussels criteria appear, verbatim
or substantially unchanged, in the 1899 and 1907 Hague Conventions and in
58
the 1929 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War.
Yet “[t]he distinction between combatant and noncombatant,” which the
Brussels criteria enable and operationalize, “is not an ancient one in the history of war, for until the Middle Ages it was the conception of war to treat
all inhabitants of the states at war, including women and children, as actual
59
enemies, subject to being slaughtered.”
By the late 1940s, according to the Nuremberg Tribunal, the regulations established by the 1907 Hague Convention had become custom, rendering
60
obsolete the “general participation” clause contained in Article II. This development, however, did not presage any dramatic movement away from reliance
61
for the enforcement of IHL on reciprocity, the political dynamics between
states, and the structural features of their professional armies. The Third Geneva
54. Roberts & Guelff, supra note 11, at 15; see also McDougal & Feliciano, supra note
50, at 532. Prosecution of violations of the laws of war under international criminal law by international institutions is a distinctly modern development, and its efficacy as a means of directly
enforcing IHL is, at least so far as anecdotal evidence indicates, marginal. See Robert D. Sloane,
The Expressive Capacity of International Punishment: The Limits of the National Law Analogy and
the Potential of International Criminal Law, 43 Stan. J. Int’l L. 39, 71–77 (2007).
55. 1907 Hague Convention, supra note 53, arts. 1–2; 1899 Hague Convention, supra note
53, arts. 1–2, 11.
56. 1907 Hague Convention, supra note 53, Annex, arts. 1–3; 1899 Hague Convention, supra
note 53, Annex, arts. 1–3 (setting forth the criteria for lawful combatancy and POW status).
57. Declaration of Brussels, Aug. 27, 1874, art. IX, reprinted in 1 The Law of War, supra
note 14, at 194, 196.
58. Convention Relating to Prisoners of War art. 1, July 27, 1929, 47 Stat. 2021, 2 Bevans
932; 1907 Hague Convention, supra note 53, Annex, art. 1; 1899 Hague Convention, supra note 53,
Annex, art. 1; see also Howard S. Levie, The 1977 Protocol I and the United States, 38 St. Louis U.
L.J. 469, 473 (1993).
59.

Nurick, supra note 39, at 681.

60. In re Goering, 13 Ann. Dig. 203, 212 (Int’l Mil. Trib. 1946), full opinion reprinted in 41
Am. J. Int’l L. 172, 248–49 (1947). General participation clauses, common in early law of war
treaties, provided that the enumerated constraints would apply only as between the states parties to
the treaties and only if all belligerents were states parties. E.g., 1907 Hague Convention, supra note
53, art. 2.
61. McDougal & Feliciano, supra note 50, at 532 (“[T]he prospects of effectively securing the limitation of violence sought by the basic policies of military necessity and humanity and by
their divers[e] specifications in the rules of warfare are contingent upon reciprocity, should be fairly
obvious, [for] in a war of any substantial duration between belligerents having the same or similar
means and weapons, reciprocal treatment tends to develop.”).
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Convention of 1949 retains the Brussels criteria substantially unchanged. To
qualify as a prisoner of war (“POW”), and by implication a lawful combat62
ant, the army to which a soldier belongs must meet four criteria:
(a) That of being commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates;
(b) That of having a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance;
(c) That of carrying arms openly;
(d) That of conducting their operations in accordance with the laws and
63
customs of war.

The Geneva Conventions of 1949, while innovative elsewhere, therefore re64
main conservative in this regard. They reiterated, and indeed reinforced, the
conventional distinction between combatants and noncombatants. This distinction presupposes the paradigm of armed conflict between states because,
in practice, it is virtually impossible for nonstate actors to meet the criteria for
65
lawful combatancy: hence the “private-army rule” of international law,
which purports to prohibit “the use of force by entities not associated with or
66
operating under delegation from a nation-state.”
Consistent with this rule, the Geneva Conventions established a system
that deliberately excluded nonstate actors in two ways. First, Common Article 2 restricts the scope of the Conventions, with the notable exception of
67
Common Article 3, to wars between states. Second, Article 4 of the Third
Geneva Convention, as emphasized in the preceding paragraph, specifies
criteria that delimit the types of combatants other than professional state
soldiers that may qualify as lawful and therefore enjoy the full panoply of
68
enumerated rights and privileges. Far from relaxing the requirements for
combatant status, the Conventions rigidified them. They also reinforced the
de facto requirement that a lawful combatant establish some nexus to a

62. Strictly speaking, the Geneva Conventions adopt these criteria for POW status, but states
understand them to be coterminous with the criteria for lawful combatancy. Frits Kalshoven &
Liesbeth Zegveld, Constraints on the Waging of War 52 (3d ed. 2001).
63. Geneva Convention (III) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 4(A)(2), Aug.
12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Geneva Convention (III)]. While an acontextual reading of the text may suggest otherwise, most commentators agree that not only “[m]embers
of other militias and members of other volunteer corps,” to whom Article 4(A)(2) expressly applies,
but also the regular armed forces of states referred to in Article 4(A)(1) must satisfy these four conditions to qualify as lawful combatants. See, e.g., 3 Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross, Commentary
on the Third Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War 63
(Jean S. Pictet ed., 1960). But see Robert M. Chesney, Leaving Guantánamo: The Law of International Detainee Transfers, 40 U. Rich. L. Rev. 657, 718–28 (2006) (recounting and analyzing the
Convention’s travaux on this issue, which suggests, though not conclusively, an alternative construction).
64.

Dinstein, supra note 43, at 36.

65.

Id. at 41.

66.

Reisman, supra note 38, at 4.

67.

E.g., Geneva Convention (III), supra note 63, art. 2.

68.

Id. art. 4.
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69

state, albeit not one that need be recognized by other state parties to the
70
Conventions—an important innovation at the time.
Consequently, despite postwar innovations such as Common Article 3,
which for the first time promulgated explicit rules for noninternational
armed conflicts, much of IHL continues to depend, above all, on a single
convention, in the informal sense, created by and for states to govern their
hostilities inter se. That convention stipulates that certain individuals affiliated with a state and defined by conventional criteria, namely, lawful
71
combatants, may deliberately kill other combatants but not civilians. This
is the “combatant’s privilege.” As Telford Taylor explains succinctly, it consists in a robust form of legal immunity:
War consists largely of acts that would be criminal if performed in time of
peace—killing, wounding, kidnapping, destroying or carrying off other
peoples’ property. Such conduct is not regarded as criminal if it takes place
in the course of war, because the state of war lays a blanket of immunity
72
over the warriors.

69. The Conventions accomplished this, in effect, by adding two new conditions to the four
traditional criteria: (1) that nonstate armed forces (however characterized, for example, as guerillas,
militias, insurgents, or otherwise) be “organized,” id. art. 4(A)(2), meaning that they “act within a
hierarchic framework, embedded in discipline, and subject to supervision by upper echelons of what
is being done by subordinate units in the field,” Dinstein, supra note 43, at 39; and (2) that they
“belong[] to a Party to the conflict,” Geneva Convention (III), supra note 63, art. 4(A)(2), meaning
that they manifest some relationship to a state party. Dinstein, supra note 43, at 39–40. Pictet similarly notes:
The solution now adopted [to the “grave problem of the treatment of ‘partisans’ falling into
enemy hands”] is to put organized resistance movements on the same footing as militia and
volunteer corps who, without forming part of the regular armed forces of the belligerent, depend nevertheless on him and fulfill the conditions laid down in the Hague Regulations [for
lawful combatancy].

Jean S. Pictet, The New Geneva Convention for the Protection of War Victims, 45 Am. J. Int’l
L. 462, 472 (1951). Even the Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilians in Time of War,
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Geneva Convention (IV)], which for the
first time extended explicit protection to civilians, covers only “those who, at a given moment and in
any manner whatsoever, find themselves, in case of a conflict or occupation, in the hands of a Party
to the conflict or Occupying Power of which they are not nationals.” Id. art. 4 (emphasis added).
70.

See Pictet, supra note 69, at 468.

71. Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross, supra note 63, at 48–49; Dinstein, supra note 43, at
27; see also Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226,
257 (July 8) (citing distinction between combatants and noncombatants as a “cardinal principle” of
humanitarian law).
72. Telford Taylor, Nuremberg and Vietnam: An American Tragedy 19 (1970); see
also Geneva Convention (III), supra note 63, arts. 87, 99; Protocol I, supra note 37, art. 43(2);
United States v. Lindh, 212 F. Supp. 2d 541, 553 (E.D. Va. 2002); Gen. Order No. 100: Instructions
for the Government of the Armies of the United States in the Field (Lieber Code), art. 57 (Dep’t of
War Apr. 24, 1863), reprinted in 1 The Law of War, supra note 15 at 169; McDougal & Feliciano, supra note 50, at 712; Knut Dörmann, The Legal Situation of “Unlawful/Unprivileged
Combatants”, 85 Int’l Rev. Red Cross 45, 45 (2003).
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Noncombatants, by contrast, may neither contribute directly to organized vio73
lence nor, conversely, be its deliberate target. And an unlawful combatant,
despite all the confusion generated by this designation recently, is simply one
74
who participates in hostilities without the combatant’s privilege.
The distinction between combatants and noncombatants has long been
understood as indispensable to the efficacy of IHL. The core principles of
IHL include distinction, which requires combatants to distinguish between
military and nonmilitary targets, and proportionality, which requires all
force to be proportional to a legitimate military objective. In the formulation
of Protocol I, state military officials must “[r]efrain from deciding to launch
any attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life,
injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof,
which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military ad75
vantage anticipated.” In practice, it would not be possible to operationalize
these principles were belligerents unable to identify combatants and distinguish them clearly from civilians; hence the vital role of legal “status
76
categories” in the traditional “protective schemes in the law of war.” The
conventional law of war therefore divided noncombatants into civilians, the
wounded or sick on land, the wounded or sick at sea, and prisoners of war,
and it supplied explicit rules to govern the treatment of persons falling
within each category. The law’s ability to limit superfluous suffering and
destruction in the midst of hostilities depends on the ability and right of belligerents to classify enemies and regulate their conduct accordingly; it
77
depends, in a phrase, on the principle of distinction. Again, I stress, as just
war theorists have long recognized, that this principle is not a moral one: it
78
is not necessarily the case that combatants bear moral guilt for wars while
73. See Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 39 (1942); Richard R. Baxter, The Duties of Combatants and the Conduct of Hostilities (Law of the Hague), in International Dimensions of
Humanitarian Law 93, 103–04 (1988).
74. George H. Aldrich, The Taliban, Al Qaeda, and the Determination of Illegal Combatants,
96 Am. J. Int’l L. 891, 892 (2002); Dörmann, supra note 72, at 46. See generally Richard R.
Baxter, So-Called ‘Unprivileged Belligerency’: Spies, Guerrillas and Saboteurs, 28 Brit. Y.B. Int’l
L. 323 (1951). Unprivileged participation in armed conflict may be a crime, but it is not a war crime
under customary international law. Dörmann, supra note 72, at 70. The United States has nonetheless indicted Omar Ahmed Khadr before a military commission for, among other things, the crimes
of attempted and actual “murder by an unprivileged belligerent.” John R. Crook, Further Development Involving the U.S. Detention Facility at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, 100 Am. J. Int’l L. 239, 240
(2006). Of course, to say that the formal definition of an unlawful combatant is simple is not to say
that determining who qualifies as a lawful combatant is simple, particularly in noninternational
armed conflicts. Hence, the Third Geneva Convention provides that, in circumstances of doubt,
“persons shall enjoy the protection of the present Convention until such time as their status has been
determined by a competent tribunal.” Geneva Convention (III), supra note 63, art. 5.
75.

Protocol I, supra note 37, art. 57(2)(a)(iii).

76. Jinks, Protective Parity, supra note 36, at 1493; accord Terry Gill & Elies van Sliedregt,
Guantánamo Bay: A Reflection On The Legal Status And Rights Of ‘Unlawful Enemy Combatants’,
1 Utrecht L. Rev. 28, 29 (2005).
77. Dinstein, supra note 43, at 29; Hans-Peter Gasser, An Appeal for Ratification by the
United States, 81 Am. J. Int’l L. 912, 919 (1987).
78. It may have been, however, in some historical contexts. Cf. The Paquete Habana, 175
U.S. 677, 690–91 (1900).
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79

civilians remain morally innocent relative to them. The distinction, rather,
rests on a convention between the parties to armed conflicts, which, in the
formative period of IHL, were states.
Postwar IHL developments have diminished the significance of status
categories, culminating in substantial overlap and convergence among the
associated protective regimes established by IHL for each category. Some
80
argue that these status categories have outlived their utility. But they re81
main central to existing IHL, and two further points should be emphasized
in this context.
First, it is a mistake to suppose that IHL does or could rely to any appreciable extent on rational-actor incentives at the individual level, especially
vis-à-vis nonstate actors. Humanitarian protection, the “carrot,” and either
its denial or the threat of criminal prosecution, the “stick,” operate almost
82
entirely at the organizational level. Rank-and-file combatants unschooled
in the jus in bello and not subject to an effective military hierarchy capable
of enforcing its rules internally will be highly unlikely to engage in rational
calculation of this sort with respect to positive law. Recall that the privatearmy rule purports to prohibit “the use of force by entities not associated
83
with or operating under delegation from a nation-state.” While, from one
perspective, this rule may be a self-serving defense of the asserted state mo84
nopoly over the legitimate use of force, sound policy considerations
underwrite the private-army rule in the IHL context. With few exceptions,
only professional state armies will be indoctrinated in the laws of war and

79. See, e.g., Walzer, supra note 7, at 144–46; Jeff McMahan, The Ethics of Killing in War,
114 Ethics 693, 695 (2004); Thomas Nagel, War and Massacre, in International Ethics, supra
note 41, at 53, 69. For further discussion, see infra Section III.A.
80. Jinks argues, for example, that a new regime guaranteeing “protective parity” to all participants in armed conflict regardless of their compliance with the formal criteria for lawful
combatancy would be both more consistent with the increasingly humanitarian emphasis of IHL
and, combined with an enforcement regime based on international criminal law, more effective.
Jinks, Declining Significance, supra note 36, at 440–42; Jinks, Protective Parity, supra note 36, at
1494, 1524–28; see also Brooks, supra note 16, at 757 (“It would be far better to make combatant
status a purely functional question, one that hinges not on technicalities, but on the degree to which
a person is directly, actively, and primarily involved in knowingly or intentionally planning or carrying out acts of violence.”); cf. Larry May, Killing Naked Soldiers: Distinguishing between
Combatants and Noncombatants, Ethics & Int’l Aff. Dec. 2005, at 39 (questioning the plausibility and moral salience of the conventional criteria for distinguishing combatants from civilians).
81.

See Dinstein, supra note 43, at 115-16.

82. But cf. Jinks, Protective Parity, supra note 36, at 1497 (“[P]rotection is offered as a carrot to encourage rule-regarding and rule-promoting conduct at the organizational and individual
level.”).
83.

Reisman, supra note 38, at 4.

84. Id. at 2. The classic statement of this view, which has become accepted dogma, appears
throughout the work of Max Weber. E.g., 1 Max Weber, Economy and Society 56 (Guenther
Roth & Claus Wittich eds., Ephraim Fischoff et al. trans., 1968) (“The claim of the modern state to
monopolize the use of force is as essential to it as its character of compulsory jurisdiction and of
continuous operation.”). Even before the rise of the modern state, analogous entities, such as princes
or lords with a territorial dominion, arrogated to themselves the ostensibly exclusive right to engage
in “legitimate” war. See Stacey, supra note 14, at 32; see also Theodor Meron, Shakespeare’s
Henry the Fifth and the Law of War, in War Crimes Law Comes of Age, supra note 14, at 11, 23.

SLOANE FINAL REVIEW 7 MR.DOC

460

10/29/2007 4:09 PM

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 106:443

subjected to an effective internal disciplinary system that can credibly guarantee a high level of compliance. I have argued elsewhere that “[p]rincipal
responsibility for controlling, judging, and punishing the conduct of individuals during times of war and other serious widespread violence must
remain in the first instance on the highly organized, and often welldisciplined collective entities—states, armies, and their cognates,” which
can enforce norms of international law by education, the inculcation of internal discipline, and norm internalization as well as by the threat of external
sanction. IHL, like international criminal law, therefore “benefits from and
indeed relies on the ‘dual positivization’ of its legal norms,” for “the best
guarantor of compliance with the laws of war . . . is not international law
85
and institutions; it is a functioning state.”
Second, law does not only regulate behavior; it expresses and shapes so86
cial meanings. In the context of IHL, for example, Protocol I disclaimed
that its application signified any change in “the legal status of the Parties to
87
the conflict.” But it perforce conferred a degree of normative legitimacy on
a particular genre of nonstate actor: “peoples . . . fighting against colonial
domination and alien occupation and against racist régimes in the exercise
88
of their right of self-determination.” When President Reagan explained his
decision not to recommend that the Senate advise and consent to Protocol I,
for example, he emphasized that “[t]he repudiation of Protocol I is one additional step, at the ideological level so important to terrorist organizations, to
89
deny these groups legitimacy as international actors.” Efforts to revise IHL
must consider not only the probable effect of proposed new rules on incentive structures but also their expressive dimensions. Offering equal
protection, privileges, and rights to members of transnational terrorist networks might confer on them—or be perceived by relevant communities to
confer—a degree of normative legitimacy that they presently lack under

85. Sloane, supra note 54, at 52 (citation omitted); see also Gerald L. Neuman, Human
Rights and Constitutional Rights: Harmony and Dissonance, 55 Stan. L. Rev. 1863, 1864 (2003).
86. See generally Elizabeth H. Anderson & Richard H. Pildes, Expressive Theories of Law:
A General Restatement, 148 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1503 (2000).
87.

Protocol I, supra note 37, art. 4.

88.

Id. art. 1(4).

89. Message to the Senate Transmitting a Protocol to the 1949 Geneva Convention, 1 Pub.
Papers 88 (Jan. 29, 1987) (emphasis added). President Reagan also expressed the view that ratification of Protocol I would “give recognition and protection to terrorist groups” and that rejecting it
“den[ies] these groups legitimacy as international actors.” Id. But cf. Gasser, supra note 77, at 917
(“Humanitarian law never legitimizes any recourse to force.”). It may be true that Protocol I did not,
as Gasser argues, legitimize recourse to armed force per se. But Article 1(4)’s recognition of what
came to be called wars of national liberation as “international” armed conflicts inevitably implied a
legitimacy for such wars that other organized violence perpetrated by nonstate actors lacked. The
implication of designating wars of national liberation as international is that a would-be state that
merits legitimacy and recognition is fighting against an extant state that does not, at least insofar as
the latter purports to govern an erstwhile colonial territory. Under contemporary international law,
after all, no “colonial,” “alien,” or “racist” state is legitimate. Cf. Guy B. Roberts, The New Rules for
Waging War: The Case Against Ratification of Additional Protocol I, 26 Va. J. Int’l L. 109, 125–26
(1986) (arguing that the recognition of national wars of liberation as international armed conflicts
would set back the effort to develop concrete and practical rules of war).
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90

international law. For both of the foregoing reasons, to decide how IHL
should be adapted to the challenge of modern transnational terrorist networks, it is instructive to consider the analogous debate that took place in
the 1970s and 1980s in connection with Protocol I.
II. Protocol I Revisited
Notwithstanding globalization and the advent of the individual as a direct subject of international law, IHL operates within and depends upon an
international legal and political system that continues to treat states as the
principal actors: the holders of rights and duties and the agents who bear
primary responsibility for enforcing its norms. Because the law of war traditionally prohibited nonstate actors from using force, its codification has,
with few exceptions, deliberately avoided the tacit sanction of such unauthorized force that might be inferred were nonstate combatants given
explicit rights or privileges. Hence, for example, the axiom that jus in bello
applies equally and uniformly to all combatants, whatever the justice or le91
gality of their casus belli, did not originally apply to nonstate actors, for
92
they did not qualify as (lawful) combatants at all.
In postwar as in prewar IHL, nonstate actors could not claim the full
panoply of rights and privileges afforded to combatants and POWs: they
93
could only claim, for the first time, an entitlement to humane treatment
94
pursuant to Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions. To reiterate, the
most significant legal consequence of the distinction between lawful combatants and unlawful combatants—apart from the “quaint” matters of postal

90. Jordan J. Paust, Post-9/11 Overreaction and Fallacies Regarding War and Defense,
Guantanamo, the Status of Persons, Treatment, Judicial Review of Detention, and Due Process in
Military Commissions, 79 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1335, 1342–43 (2004) (cautioning against expanding the ambit of war rules to non-state actors such as al-Qaeda and citing certain undesirable
consequences that would, in his view, follow from this, such as “ legitimizing various . . . combatant
acts and immunizing them from prosecution.”).
91. See, e.g., Hersch. Lauterpacht, The Limits of the Operation of the Law of War, 30 Brit.
Y.B. Int’l L. 206, 215–20 (1953); see also sources cited supra note 44.
92. The Hague Conventions recognized only one exception: the levée en masse, a now obsolete legacy of the Franco-Prussian War of 1870. Kalshoven & Zegveld, supra note 62, at 40. See
1899 Hague Convention, supra note 53, Annex, art. II; 1907 Hague Convention, supra note 53,
Annex, art. II. The 1907 Convention noted as follows:
The inhabitants of a territory which has not been occupied, who, on the approach of the enemy,
spontaneously take up arms to resist the invading troops without having had time to organize
themselves in accordance with [the four criteria for lawful combatancy], shall be regarded as
belligerents if they carry arms openly and if they respect the laws and customs of war.

1907 Hague Convention, supra note 53, Annex, art. II. Delegates could not reach agreement, by
contrast, on the treatment of francs-tireurs, “detached bodies of men who harassed the enemy from
within, without using guerilla tactics.” Lester Nurick & Roger W. Barrett, Questions of Guerilla
Forces Under the Laws of War, 40 Am. J. Int’l L. 563, 573 (1946).
93. Kalshoven & Zegveld, supra note 62, at 41, 60; see also Geneva Convention (IV),
supra note 69, art. 5.
94.

See George H. Aldrich, The Laws of War on Land, 94 Am. J. Int’l L. 42, 58 (2000).
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privileges, sports opportunities, monthly pay advances, and so forth to
which Gonzales presumably referred in his January 25, 2002, memoran96
dum —is that the latter may be prosecuted for participating in armed
conflict. Belligerents failing to conform to the Article 4 criteria, though no
longer subject to extrajudicial killing, may be tried as criminals for murder,
97
assault, and other acts characteristic of war.
In what is surely an understatement, Yoram Dinstein remarks that “it is
not easy for irregular forces to comply cumulatively with” the criteria for
98
lawful combatancy. The reason is that these criteria derive from and reflect
the private-army rule and the paradigm of war between professional nation99
state armies. From a state-centric perspective, of course, this is not a problem: it is as it should be. But the overwhelming majority of postwar
100
conflicts have not been between states. Furthermore, as the old law of war
(classically based on the international political dynamics between states)
evolved into modern IHL (with its explicit synergy with the proliferating
101
corpus of international human rights law), the virtually blanket exclusion
of nonstate actors that had been deliberately entrenched by the postwar system began to seem intolerable or unjust to many.
In 1968, the United Nations General Assembly adopted Resolution
2444, entitled “Respect for Human Rights in Armed Conflicts,” an emblem
102
of the synergy between modern IHL and international human rights law.
After World War II, international law also quickly came to embrace the right
103
of all peoples to self-determination in the context of decolonization. This
lent legitimacy to the increasing number of armed struggles being waged by
the inhabitants of territories still under colonial administration: hence, for

95.

Geneva Convention (III), supra note 63, arts. 38, 72, 60.

96.

Gonzales Memorandum, supra note 25.

97.

E.g., Taylor, supra note 72, at 22.

98.

Dinstein, supra note 43, at 41.

99. See George H. Aldrich, New Life for the Laws of War, 75 Am. J. Int’l L. 764, 769
(1981) (noting that the POW requirements specified in Article 4(A)(2) of the Third Geneva Convention appear to contemplate full-time soldiers); see also Brooks, supra note 16, at 706, 730.
100. Steven R. David, The Primacy of Internal War, in International Relations Theory
and the Third World 77, 77 (Stephanie G. Neuman ed., 1998); Kenneth J. Keith, Rights and
Responsibilities: Protecting the Victims of Armed Conflict, 48 Duke L.J. 1081, 1089 (1999).
101. G.I.A.D. Draper, Wars of National Liberation and War Criminality, in Restraints on
War 135, 143 (Michael Howard ed., 1979) (“[The Protocols of 1977] displayed the close nexus, in
juridical terms, between the international law regimes of Human Rights and the new Humanitarian
Law of Armed Conflicts . . . .”).
102. Respect for Human Rights in Armed Conflicts, G.A. Res. 2444, U.N. GAOR, 23d Sess.,
Supp. No. 18, U.N. Doc. A/7433 (Dec. 19, 1968).
103. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 1541, Annex, Principle VI, at 29, U.N. GAOR, 15th Sess., Supp. No.
16, U.N. Doc. A/4684 (Dec. 15, 1960); G.A. Res. 1514, at 66, U.N. GAOR, 15th Sess., Supp. No.
16, U.N. Doc. A/4684 (Dec. 14, 1960); Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, 1975 I.C.J. 12, 31–36
(Oct. 16); Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia
(South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion,
1971 I.C.J. 16, 31 (June 21).
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example, the United Nations demanded that liberation fighters in Portu104
guese, French, and other colonies be treated as POWs.
In the context of decolonization (and beyond), the private-army rule
came under stress for two principal reasons. First, private armies raise the
global expectation of unauthorized violence and destabilize world public
order because they operate outside the interstate political constraints of the
traditional laws of war, including reciprocity. Yet within the emerging legal
and normative regime of international human rights law, “insistence on nonviolence and deference to all established institutions in a global system with
many injustices [seemed to] be tantamount to confirmation and reinforce105
ment of those injustices.”
Apartheid-era South Africa offered a
paradigmatic example of this predicament. Second, the inherited laws of war
presume the stability of states, including both their authority—that is, effective and plenary control over their territory—and legitimacy—in the sense
of popular normative acquiescence or support. Because the stable identity of
106
many states is a fiction, so too—at least to this extent and in this regard—
is the rationale for the private-army rule.
These issues came to a head during the decolonization era, when the authority, legitimacy, and identity of many states fluctuated. States also
recognized at the time—in the popular, if anachronistic, terminology used
today—that “failed states” could seriously threaten international peace and
107
security. From an IHL perspective, it also made little sense to treat a former private army that fortuitously managed to seize control of the state as
thereafter the rightful claimant to a state monopoly on organized violence
and, by extension, the sole entity with the right to have its soldiers treated as
lawful combatants. Conversely, effective control of the apparatus of the state
allowed the new regime to brand the combatants of other organized militias
as criminals, subject to prosecution for participation in war without the
combatant’s privilege. In short, the private-army rule seemed, and continues
to seem, arbitrary in contexts in which both the efficacy and legitimacy of
108
states fluctuate.
The inherited law of war, which vested the combatant’s privilege almost
exclusively in state actors, therefore proved both unworkable and, in some
circumstances, normatively intolerable. It essentially made criminals of all
104.

Kalshoven & Zegveld, supra note 62, at 13, 31.

105. Reisman, supra note 38, at 6; see also George J. Andreopoulos, The Age of National
Liberation Movements, in The Laws of War, supra note 14, at 191.
106. Konrad G. Bühler, State Succession and Membership in International
Organizations 18 (2001); see also Reisman, supra note 38, at 5–6 (“A significant number of the
nominal states of the world do not exercise anything approaching plenary power within their borders; they are treated as nation-states because of the tacit or express agreement or the coincidental
disinterest of the effective global elites.”); cf. Louis Henkin, International Law: Politics and
Values 8–13 (1995) (deconstructing the idea of state sovereignty).
107. See Rosa Ehrenreich Brooks, Failed States, or the State as Failure?, 72 U. Chi. L. Rev.
1159, 1160–61 (2005).
108. Reisman, supra note 38, at 4. Strictly applied to such contexts, the private-army rule
“becomes an international confirmation of effective power; in other words, a private army is unlawful if it is not winning.” Id. at 5.
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but a few nonstate actors who sought to participate in armed conflict, whatever the normative force of their casus belli. From a modern IHL
perspective, in which one of the law’s paramount objectives is to reduce
human suffering and destruction in war to the greatest extent practicable, the
inherited law also began to seem counterproductive. George Aldrich, the
chief U.S. delegate to the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and
Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflict, Geneva, 1974–1977, stressed that the conventional rule requiring that
an insurgent “distinguish himself at all times from the civilian population
109
will simply make him an outlaw: he cannot respect it and hope to survive.”
The criteria for lawful combatancy entrenched by the inherited law of war
were, Aldrich and others argued, impracticable if not suicidal for nonstate
combatants:
By adopting standards of distinction that are impossible to respect and by
providing escape clauses through which the occupying power can deny
PW status to captured guerillas, the 1949 Convention virtually assures that
guerillas in occupied territory will disguise themselves as civilians and that
110
the civilian population will suffer as a result.

Consequently, at the 1974–77 Diplomatic Conference, delegates sought
to revise and update the law of war in recognition of two facts relevant to
this discussion: (1) the overwhelming majority of postwar armed conflicts
had been internal, and (2) the proliferation of nonstate actors in armed conflicts and the consequent need to integrate them into the conventional war
system meant that to preserve the private-army rule in its pure form would
ill serve the humanitarian objectives of modern IHL. If nonstate actors,
which constitute the vast majority of combatants in armed conflicts worldwide, were to remain by definition excluded from the law of armed conflict,
IHL would be limited in its utility to the small minority of armed conflicts
fought between states. Because one of IHL’s chief goals is to reduce superfluous suffering in war, it would be better to integrate at least some nonstate
actors into the conventional system created by and for states.
States therefore designed Protocol I, in part, to ameliorate what they saw
as a key defect of the Geneva Conventions: the failure to offer irregular,
nonstate combatants any external incentive to comply with the laws of
109. Aldrich, supra note 99, at 769; see also Dinstein, supra note 43, at 42 (“From a pragmatic standpoint, many believe that ‘obedience to these rules would be tantamount to committing
suicide, as far as most guerillas would be concerned.’ ”) (quoting G. von Glahn, The Protection of
Human Rights in Time of Armed Conflict, 1 Isr. Y.B. Hum. Rts. 208, 223 (1971)); George H. Aldrich, Progressive Development of the Laws of War: A Reply to Criticisms of the 1977 Geneva
Protocol I, 26 Va. J. Int’l L. 693, 704 (1986) [hereinafter Aldrich, Progressive Development]
(“[I]rregular armed forces . . . cannot possibly comply with the [requirement that they bear a fixed
distinctive sign recognizable at a distance] and hope to survive.”). Furthermore, Aldrich argued, the
Third Geneva Convention established an unjustifiable double standard: violations of the laws and
customs of war by “regular, uniformed armed forces” did not result in the loss of their POW status,
but nonstate actors would be deprived of that status if, in the view of the detaining power (that is, a
state), “the guerilla armed forces as a whole . . . have not adequately respected the laws of war.”
Aldrich, supra note 99, at 769.
110.

Aldrich, supra note 99, at 770; see also id. at 774.
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111

war. Protocol I sought to accommodate the asserted legitimacy of many
national liberation movements (“NLMs”) deemed to be fighting “just
112
war[s]” against colonial authorities. It sought to integrate NLMs into the
global war system by holding out the “carrot” represented by the various
rights and privileges formerly reserved for the soldiers of professional state
armies. Protocol I, its proponents hoped, would thereby alter the rational
calculus presumably engaged in by such irregular combatants so that they
113
would be both able and incentivized to comply with IHL. It did this in
three ways. First, Article 1(4) expanded the definition of international armed
conflict for purposes of the Geneva Conventions and Protocol I to
include armed conflicts in which peoples are fighting against colonial
domination and alien occupation and against racist régimes in the exercise
of their right of self-determination, as enshrined in the Charter of the
United Nations and the Declaration on Principles of International Law
concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accor114
dance with the Charter of the United Nations.

Second, Articles 43 and 44 relaxed—or eviscerated, depending on one’s
perspective—the criteria for POW status enumerated in Article 4 of the
115
Third Geneva Convention. Third, Article 96 offered certain nonstate actors
an opportunity to participate in the conventional war system by making a
formal declaration undertaking “to apply the Conventions and this Protocol”
in relation to “an armed conflict of the type referred to in Article 1, para116
graph 4.”

111. Id. at 769–70; Aldrich, Progressive Development, supra note 109, at 703–08. For a more
recent assessment, see George H. Aldrich, Prospects for United States Ratification of Additional
Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, 85 Am. J. Int’l L. 1 (1991).
112.

Roberts, supra note 89, at 124–25, 127.

113. Aldrich, Progressive Development, supra note 109, at 704; see also id. at 707 (“[I]t
makes sense to encourage part-time combatants to comply with the rule of distinction during attacks
and military operations preparatory to attack by recognizing their combatant status and POW rights
if they do so and by subjecting them to criminal penalties if they fail to do so.”).
114.

Protocol I, supra note 37, art. 1(4).

115. Article 43 stipulates that “armed forces” with “the right to participate directly in hostilities” include “all organized armed forces, groups and units” under responsible command and “an
internal disciplinary system which, inter alia, shall enforce compliance with the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict.” Id. art. 43. It thereby, in effect, reduces the four criteria for
lawful combatancy to two: responsible command and compliance with the laws of war. But Article
44 then provides that “violations of these rules shall not deprive a combatant of his right to be a
combatant,” id. art. 44(2), and that even a combatant who fails to observe the relaxed requirement of
distinction set out in Article 44(3), although he “shall forfeit his right to be a prisoner of war, . . .
shall, nevertheless, be given protections equivalent in all respects to those accorded to prisoners of
war by the Third [Geneva] Convention and by this Protocol,” id. art. 44(4). Dinstein, reflecting a
view held by many, opines that “[t]he pendulum in the Article has swung from one extreme to the
other, reducing ad absurdum the conditions of lawful combatancy. The outcome is that, for contracting Parties to the Protocol, the general distinction between lawful and unlawful combatants becomes
nominal in value.” Dinstein, supra note 43, at 47; see also Keith Suter, An International Law
of Guerilla Warfare 165–69 (1984).
116.

Protocol I, supra note 37, art. 96(3).
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Unsurprisingly, a considerable number of states and military strategists
resisted these changes vigorously. Some argued that Protocol I would give
117
“rights to terrorists.” Others cautioned that the proposed new system
would fundamentally undermine IHL’s efficacy. They saw Article 1(4) as a
misguided effort to reintroduce the discredited concept of “just war” into
118
IHL. This reintroduction would in effect “license belligerent foreign meddling in the sovereign domain of certain states, politicize humanitarian law,
and thereby render humanitarian law even less sturdy a shield for its in119
tended beneficiaries.” Furthermore, opponents argued, the elimination or
relaxation of the traditional criteria for lawful combatancy would in practice
fail to offer any real incentive to irregular combatants to comply with IHL,
for “[p]ersons who resort to guerilla warfare . . . face many privations and
the promise of POW status is unlikely to be an inducement to restrain opera120
tions which they believe necessary for victory.” To the contrary, by
“[r]ecognizing . . . that there are situations in armed conflicts where, owing
to the nature of the hostilities an armed combatant cannot . . . distinguish
121
himself” from the civilian population, the proposed new rules would authorize and perhaps even encourage abuses and violations of the principle of
122
123
distinction —hallmarks of terrorism. Opponents of the Protocol feared
that the purportedly limited exception created by Article 44 would swallow
124
the rule.

117. William Safire, Rights for Terrorists?, N.Y. Times, Nov. 15, 1984, at A31; see also
Douglas J. Feith, Law in the Service of Terror—The Strange Case of the Additional Protocol, Nat’l
Int., Fall 1985, at 36; Abraham D. Sofaer, Terrorism and the Law, 64 Foreign Aff. 901, 912–15
(1986).
118. See Antonio Cassese, The Geneva Protocols of 1977 on the Humanitarian Law of Armed
Conflict and Customary International Law, 3 UCLA Pac. Basin L.J. 55, 69 & n.56 (1984); Draper,
supra note 101, at 157–60; Roberts, supra note 89, at 124–27.
119. Feith, supra note 117, at 41. But see Levie, supra note 58, at 471–72 (emphasizing that
the preamble refutes the suggestion that Protocol I reintroduces the “just war” doctrine).
120.

Suter, supra note 115, at 168.

121.

Protocol I, supra note 37, art. 44(3).

122. See, e.g., Sofaer, supra note 117, at 914–15; Abraham D. Sofaer, The Rationale for the
United States Decision, 82 Am. J. Int’l L. 784, 786 (1988); see also Howard S. Levie, Prisoners of
War Under the 1977 Protocol I, 23 Akron L. Rev. 55, 64 (1989) (“[Under Article 44(3),] combatants may merge with the crowd, weapons concealed, until they are about to attack, at which time
they move out of the crowd, disclose their weapons, and begin their attack . . . . [a prospect that
would undoubtedly] increase the dangers to the civilian population.”).
123. See S. Treaty Doc. No. 100-2, at IX (1986) (“As the essence of terrorist criminality is
the obliteration of the distinction between combatants and noncombatants, it would be hard to
square ratification of this Protocol [I] with the United States’ announced policy of combating terrorism.”); see also Safire, supra note 117.
124. But see Gasser, supra note 77, at 919–20 (emphasizing the exceptional nature of the
circumstances contemplated by Article 44(3) and the limited conditions under which it may be
properly invoked). Aldrich and others also responded thoughtfully to this criticism. See, e.g.,
Aldrich, supra note 99; Waldemar A. Solf, A Response to Douglas J. Feith’s Law in the Service of
Terror—The Strange Case of the Additional Protocol, 20 Akron L. Rev. 261 (1986). See generally
Agora: The U.S. Decision Not to Ratify Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions on the Protection of
War Victims (pts. 1 & 2), 81 Am. J. Int’l L. 910 (1987), 82 Am. J. Int’l L. 784 (1988).
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Yet as the era of decolonization wound down, the debate became, for all
125
intents and purposes, obsolete. Experience effectively “resolved” the disputes prompted by Articles 1(4), 43, 44, and 96(3) by showing that they
would remain academic. To date, no insurgent group that would arguably
qualify under Article 1(4) of Protocol I has made a declaration under Article
126
96(3), which would have been required to bring the Protocol into effect in
127
the circumstances set forth in Article 1(4). Nor has any irregular, nonstate
combatant fighting in an actual international armed conflict—to which Protocol I, it should be recalled, principally applies—been afforded POW status
128
or “equivalent treatment” under Articles 43 or 44. Experience suggests
that Protocol I, while successful in other respects, has failed, as Aldrich recognized it might, “in its efforts to give irregular armed forces adequate
129
inducements to distinguish themselves from the civilian population.” Neither, however, has the existence of Protocol I lent support to or legitimized
terrorism as critics projected. In short, while many of the less controversial
provisions of Protocol I have now crystallized into or been recognized as
130
custom, worries about the extent to which the Protocol would confer legitimacy on terrorists or obliterate the principle of distinction have become
moot—in large part because NLMs no longer constitute the paradigmatic
nonstate actor of concern to IHL.
III. IHL and the “New” Nonstate Actor
Of what relevance is this to current debates over the proper conduct of
hostilities in the “war” against modern transnational terrorist networks? To
be clear, I stress at the outset that Protocol I cannot plausibly be thought to
131
apply to armed conflict with such networks. I agree with those who argue
125. Theodor Meron, The Time Has Come for the United States to Ratify Geneva Protocol I,
88 Am. J. Int’l L. 678, 682 (1994).
126.

Id. at 683.

127.

See Gasser, supra note 77, at 917.

128.

Meron, supra note 125, at 683.

129. Aldrich, Progressive Development, supra note 109, at 708; see also Meron, supra note
125, at 682–83.
130. See Jean-Marie Henckaerts, Study on Customary International Humanitarian Law, 99
Am. Soc’y Int’l L. Proc. 423, 424 (2005); Theodor Meron, War Crimes in Yugoslavia and the
Development of International Law, 88 Am. J. Int’l L. 78, 80 (1994).
131. Construing Protocol I “in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given
to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose” makes this clear
beyond doubt. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 31(1), May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S.
331. First, the new genre of nonstate actors does not qualify under Article 1(4) as one of the “peoples . . . fighting against colonial domination and alien occupation and against racist régimes in the
exercise of their right of self-determination.” Protocol I, supra note 37, art. 1(4). Nor is armed conflict with transnational terrorist networks like al-Qaeda international in the strict sense: it is not a
conflict between two or more states, and it does not become international simply because terrorists
operate transnationally. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2756–57, 2795–96 (2006). Second, needless to say, neither al-Qaeda nor any other transnational terrorist network has declared
under Article 96(3) of Protocol I its intention to apply the Geneva Conventions and the Protocol.
Third, at the collective level, terrorist networks cannot satisfy even the minimal, relaxed requirements
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that as a matter of positive law, the global war on terrorism—insofar as it
refers to a literal state of armed conflict with al-Qaeda and its allies—in
most circumstances falls within the rubric of noninternational armed con132
flict to which Common Article 3 applies, as the Supreme Court suggested
133
in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld. Beyond this, however, it should be clear that the
conceptual framework of Protocol I is misplaced in the context of modern
transnational terrorist networks typified by al-Qaeda. The prototypical nonstate actor of this new paradigm is not a nonstate combatant who, but for the
impracticable nature of the law of war vis-à-vis nonstate combatants, would
be amenable to compliance with IHL and would strive to avoid endangering
noncombatants.
At best, the members of modern transnational terrorist networks may be
indifferent to the deleterious effects of organized violence on noncombatants. More likely, they wish to maximize those effects and thereby
spread terror as a means to achieve their political or ideological goals. This
134
strategy, after all, is a distinctive, though not necessarily definitional,
135
characteristic of terrorism. Insurgents battling alien or colonial regimes,
and other nonstate actors who have employed terrorism as a strategy (for
example, the Irish Republican Army, Euskadi Ta Askatasuna, or the Tamil
Tigers), typically aspire to statehood, autonomy, regime change, or some
other concrete form of political status that the international legal system
could—in theory if not always in practice—accommodate. The Protocol I
debate presumed that if only the laws of war could be revised to make compliance by nonstate actors practicable, NLMs would wish to comply: NLMs
did not characteristically or in principle reject the principle of distinction,
noncombatant immunity, or any other precept of IHL. Rather, as proponents
of Protocol I argued, they could not comply with the war convention and
hope to survive, still less prevail. Before the demise of apartheid, for example, certain antiapartheid groups fighting the racist South African regime did
for lawful combatancy set forth in Article 43: responsible command and “an internal disciplinary
system which, inter alia, shall enforce compliance with the rules of international law applicable in
armed conflict.” Protocol I, supra note 37, art. 43(1). To the contrary, most transnational terrorist
organizations deliberately, as a matter of strategy adopted or endorsed by the elite of the organization, flout a paramount principle of the law of armed conflict: distinction. Finally, at the individual
level, seldom if ever do the members of such networks fulfill even the sole extant requirement for
lawful combatancy under Article 43: carrying arms openly at least during each military engagement
or “deployment preceding the launching of an attack.” Id. art. 44(3)(b). See also Levie, supra note
58, at 476; cf. William H. Taft, IV, The Law of Armed Conflict After 9/11: Some Salient Features, 28
Yale J. Int’l L. 319, 320–21 (2003) (arguing that members of terrorist networks enjoy no special
status under the law of armed conflict and, in particular, enjoy no colorable claim to POW status
under the criteria enumerated in Article 4 of the Third Geneva Convention).
132. E.g., Aldrich, supra note 74, at 893. At the same time, I agree with those, including the
International Committee of the Red Cross, who propose that the global war on terrorism be disaggregated into “more manageable parts” and the appropriate body of law applied to each.
Wippman, supra note 34, at 18. Whether unprivileged combatants benefit from Geneva Convention
(IV) is a contentious issue on which I express no view here. See Dörmann, supra note 72, at 48–60.
133.

126 S. Ct. at 2795–96.

134.

See Jeremy Waldron, Terrorism and the Uses of Terror, 8 J. Ethics 5 (2004).

135. Michael Walzer, Terrorism: A Critique of Excuses, in Arguing about War 51, 51
(2004); see also Scheffler, supra note 22.
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not respect the principle of distinction and were labeled terrorists. Yet
members of these same groups—including eminent figures such as Albie
Sachs, now a justice of the Constitutional Court of South Africa—currently
govern a postapartheid South Africa with a constitution and judicial system
that, for all its flaws and difficulties, is in many respects a beacon of the
progressive application of international human rights law. In short, while
NLMs often violate the war convention, they do not characteristically repudiate it in principle.
By contrast, the transnational terrorist networks of concern to modern
IHL do not aspire to join the existing international system. Nor do they accept the war convention’s precepts. For strategic or ideological reasons—or
both—they generally repudiate the “norms, customs, professional codes,
legal precepts, religious and philosophical principles, and reciprocal ar137
rangements” that underwrite IHL. The common denominator of the war
convention—which, absent reciprocity, reputation, and other interstate political dynamics, makes it “work,” however imperfectly—is a shared
normative commitment to reducing superfluous suffering and harm in war.
And the main convention by which IHL accomplishes this is the axiom of
noncombatant immunity, which modern transnational terrorist networks
typified by al-Qaeda reject. This “new” genre of nonstate actor also rejects
the secular, aspirationally universal conception of human dignity underlying
138
international human rights law.
I put “new” in quotation marks because this genre of nonstate actor is
139
not really unprecedented in the respects just emphasized. What is genuinely new is the geopolitical and technological context in which all nonstate
actors now operate. Globalization has facilitated the (legal and illegal)
140
transborder movement of persons and goods, making it far easier than in
the past for nonstate actors to inflict major, even catastrophic, damage with
141
a single or limited number of strikes. In the context of IHL, nonstate
136. U.S. Dep’t of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1988, at 82 (1989); Bernard
Weinraub, White House; The Speech That Launched a Thousand Critics, N.Y. Times, July 28, 1986,
at A12 (quoting President Reagan’s characterization of the African National Congress and other
antiapartheid organizations). See generally Marina Ottaway, Liberation Movements and Transition
to Democracy: The Case of the A.N.C., 29 J. Mod. Afr. Stud. 61 (1991).
137.

Walzer, supra note 7, at 44.

138. Universal Declaration of Human Rights pmbl., G.A. Res. 217A at 71, U.N. GAOR, 3d
Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948). This is not to suggest that the members of
such networks lack any conception of human dignity; only that the conception they embrace cannot
be reconciled with international human rights norms. Cf. Robert D. Sloane, Outrelativizing Relativism: A Liberal Defense of the Universality of International Human Rights, 34 Vand. J. Transnat’l
L. 527, 574–75 (2001).
139.

See generally Paul Berman, Terror and Liberalism (2003).

140.

See generally Naím, supra note 47.

141. Ruth Wedgwood, Countering Catastrophic Terrorism: An American View, in Enforcing
International Law Norms Against Terrorism 103, 104 (Andrea Bianchi ed., 2004) (cautioning
that “[t]he freedom of movement prized in a Schengen ethos can be used to fly couriers, paymasters,
and bomb-makers in and about of a country” and that “[t]he technology available on a world market
can be purchased by a private group and married to a violent and atavistic worldview”); see also
Reisman, supra note 45, at 86.
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actors refer broadly to any combatant not formally authorized by a state to
engage in violence. They exist in varying degrees of organization. Some
form private armies; others act independently or in smaller collective units
such as terrorist cells. Can we draw any generalizations about the particular
genre of nonstate actor in modern warfare typified by al-Qaeda? I do not
presume to be an expert on al-Qaeda, Islamic fundamentalism, or transnational terrorist networks generally, and to that extent, I hesitate to
generalize. Tentatively, however, I want to stress two characteristics of these
networks relevant to modern IHL.
A. Noncombatant Immunity
First, modern transnational terrorist networks typified by al-Qaeda characteristically reject the IHL principles of noncombatant immunity and
distinction. In a relatively early interview, for example, Osama bin Laden
said candidly, “We do not have to differentiate between military or civilian
142
[sic]. As far as we are concerned, they are all targets.” He explained elsewhere that while “the Prophet forbade the killing of [innocents],” the Qur’an
also instructs Muslims to “punish [your enemy] with the like of that with
143
which you were afflicted.” In short, the essential rationale is lex talionis,
an eye for an eye: “We treat others like they treat us. Those who kill our
women and our innocent, we kill their women and innocent, until they stop
144
doing so.”
Lex talionis is an archaic principle of justice. It generally serves as a ra145
tionale for, or crude barometer of, just punishment. Applying lex talionis
to war, one might logically conclude that it is acceptable to kill those noncombatants who share culpability for the causes of the war. This is what bin
Laden appears to suggest: it is justifiable for members of the al-Qaeda network to kill civilians because, at least in liberal democracies, they cannot be
regarded as genuinely innocent of the network’s grievances, its casus belli:
The American people should remember that they pay taxes to their government and that they voted for their president. Their government makes
weapons and provides them to Israel, which they use to kill Palestinian
Muslims. Given that the American Congress is a committee that represents
the people, the fact that it agrees with the actions of the American government proves that America in its entirety is responsible for the atrocities that
146
it is committing against Muslims.

142.

9/11 Comm’n Report, supra note 23, at 47.

143. Messages to the World: The Statements of Osama bin Laden 118 (Bruce Lawrence ed., James Howarth trans., 2005) [hereinafter Messages to the World].
144.

Id. at 118–119; see also id. at 140–41.

145.

See generally Jeremy Waldron, Lex Talionis, 34 Ariz. L. Rev. 25 (1992).

146. Messages to the World, supra note 143, at 140–41; see also id. at 61 (“To kill the
American [sic] and their allies—civilians and military—is an individual duty incumbent upon every
Muslim.”).
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This view is not based on an implausible conception of innocence. But it
is not the conception that animates the inherited war convention. Modern
just war theory and contemporary IHL use innocence relative to noncombatants as a term of art. In common parlance, innocence often means
moral innocence. Its antonym is guilt or culpability. But in the context of war,
the operative notion of innocence is not moral innocence, and it is not opposed to moral guilt. If it were, then we would be justified in killing a
wicked but noncombatant hairdresser in an enemy city who supported the
evil policies of his government, and unjustified in killing a morally pure
conscript who was driving a tank toward us with the profoundest regrets
and nothing but love in his heart. But moral innocence has very little to do
147
with it . . . .

Of course, whether innocence has a moral connotation depends on what
we mean by morality. In the just war literature, “ ‘innocent’ derives from the
Latin nocentes, which means ‘those who injure or are harmful.’ The inno148
cent are those who are not nocentes.” Noncombatant immunity from direct
attack is thought to follow from the fact that civilians, unlike combatants,
“have done nothing, and are doing nothing, that entails the loss of their
149
rights.” By contrast, it is said, combatants—by virtue of their training,
arms, and very purpose—have been made dangerous or harmful and for that
150
reason may be lawfully attacked. This is certainly a moral account insofar
as it is based on a theory that presupposes rights, which may be lost by certain conduct. Alternatively, if “[t]he immunity of noncombatants is best
thought of as a convention-dependent obligation . . . which substitutes for
151
[unrestrained] warfare a certain form of limited combat,” then the operative notion of morality at work in the conventional conception of

147. Nagel, supra note 79, at 69; accord Mavrodes, supra note 41, at 80–81 (providing a
similar hyperbolic contrast). Earlier just war theorists, particularly those in the Christian tradition,
did rely on a moral conception of innocence: noncombatants were deemed inherently innocent visà-vis the causes and violence of war. Mavrodes, supra note 41, at 76–82. (summarizing and critiquing the views of Elizabeth Anscombe, John C. Ford, and Paul Ramsey). The examples offered by
Nagel, Mavrodes, and others show why it is wrong to presume that a moral-culpability conception
of innocence underwrites the convention of noncombatant immunity. Still, some civilians—for
example, children—clearly should be deemed innocent of the causes of or guilt for war. Yet because
of their beliefs about the fate that awaits children killed in a jihad operation, many Islamic militants
typified by al-Qaeda believe that children, too, may be killed without violating any religious stricture. See Moss & Mekhennet, supra note 42.
148. McMahan, supra note 79, at 695; see also Jeff McMahan, On the Moral Equality of
Combatants, 14 J. Pol. Phil. 377, 380 (2006).
149.

Walzer, supra note 7, at 146; see also id. at 144–45.

150. Id. at 145; see also id. at 138 (“The first principle of the war convention is that, once war
has begun, soldiers are subject to attack at any time (unless they are wounded or captured).”); accord Nagel, supra note 79, at 70. For a critique of this theoretical basis for noncombatant immunity,
see May, supra note 80, at 44–46.
151. Mavrodes, supra note 41, at 85; cf. McDougal & Feliciano, supra note 50, at 543–44
(“Thus, in confining combatancy generally to relatively well-defined categories of persons, such as
members of the public armed forces, the rules of warfare may be seen to reflect a policy of limiting
the involvement—that is, the participation and hence subjection to direct violence—of individuals in
war.”).
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noncombatant immunity is more consequentialist in nature: it serves the
moral purpose of reducing the aggregate death, suffering, and destruction
caused by war.
But whether we find Walzer’s deontological account persuasive, prefer
Mavrodes’s consequentialist view, or adopt some alternative rationale for
the convention of noncombatant immunity is not terribly important in this
152
context. Given the fact of value pluralism within any political commu153
nity, and a fortiori within the figurative international community, we can
154
expect no more than an “incompletely theorized agreement” on the rationale for noncombatant immunity. Yet that is also all that is needed for this
paramount convention of the law of war and its corollaries—the principles
of necessity, distinction, and proportionality—to function. When I say that
modern transnational terrorist networks typified by al-Qaeda reject this convention, I mean that, as bin Laden’s remarks suggest, they seem to view
noncombatant immunity as a defeasible principle that can be discarded in
circumstances where the enemy, in their perception, bears moral guilt for
the grievances that constitute their casus belli. Given this idiosyncratic con155
ception of noncombatant immunity,
coupled with the increasing
availability of weapons of mass destruction to nonstate actors, further catastrophic attacks on or exceeding the scale of September 11, 2001, must be
appreciated as a genuine threat to which IHL will ultimately need to adapt.
Of course, the conclusion that modern transnational terrorist networks
typified by al-Qaeda reject the conventional conception of noncombatant
immunity is in one sense hardly surprising. I stress it in this context because
156
of the shift from a crime to a war paradigm. Before September 11, 2001,
states often conceived of and responded to terrorism principally within the
157
rubric of crime and law enforcement. To speak of the principles of distinction and proportionality in that context would be incongruous: these are not
principles of criminal law. Terrorism would not suddenly lose its criminal
character were it carried out with due regard for these principles: only the
combatant’s privilege confers the legal right to kill or damage even military
personnel and infrastructure. But it is clear that for better or worse, some
states, especially the United States, now conceive of terrorism within the

152. For an alternative account of the rationale for noncombatant immunity, see, for example,
Robert K. Fullinwider, War and Innocence, in International Ethics, supra note 41, at 90. But see
Lawrence A. Alexander, Self-Defense and the Killing of Noncombatants: A Reply to Fullinwider, in
International Ethics, supra note 41, at 98.
153.

See Isaiah Berlin, Two Concepts of Liberty, in Liberty 166 (Henry Hardy ed., 2002).

154. Cass R. Sunstein, Commentary, Incompletely Theorized Agreements, 108 Harv. L. Rev.
1733 (1995).
155. I do not mean to suggest that only Islamic militants typified by al-Qaeda adopt this view
of noncombatant immunity. See Moss & Mekhennet, supra note 42.
156. See William Lietzau, Combating Terrorism: The Consequences of Moving from Law
Enforcement to War, in New Wars, New Laws?, supra note 34, at 31.
157. Id. at 33. This is not always the case: the United States responded to the Libyan bombing
of La Belle Discotheque with military strikes, for example.
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158

rubric of armed conflict. Given that this rubric has been applied, IHL must
adapt to the reality that one figurative party to this particular conflict rejects
159
its central convention : a robust principle of noncombatant immunity based
on an amoral—in the culpability sense of that term—conception of what it
means to be innocent and therefore not subject to direct attack. In short, insofar as war is a rule-governed activity, the opponent in this war rejects the
160
most basic rule.
I emphatically do not mean to suggest, and it does not follow, that states
should abandon the principles of necessity, proportionality, and distinction
relative to the global war on terrorism. That would be not only a moral tragedy but a serious strategic error. Nor do I mean to argue, as some do, that a
bilateral conception of reciprocity remains the Grundnorm of IHL and states
therefore need not observe IHL relative to an enemy that baldly repudiates
161
it. If IHL is to function effectively within the context of the new paradigm,
however, it must recognize that its core convention will be observed by only
one side—in a geopolitical context in which the catastrophic weapons formerly monopolized by states have become increasingly available to nonstate
actors.
B. A Network of Networks
Second, modern transnational terrorist networks typified by al-Qaeda
characteristically lack the structural features that enable a reasonable level
of compliance with IHL. Because of their diffuse, decentralized nature, they

158. In contrast, thus far, European states have tended to respond to “new terrorism threats”
with “traditional law enforcement methods.” Gerald L. Neuman, Comment, Counter-terrorist Operations and the Rule of Law, 15 Eur. J. Int’l L. 1019, 1019 (2004).
159. Modern transnational terrorist networks differ in this regard from, for example, Kamikazes,
who engaged in suicide bombings as legitimate acts of warfare. Kamikazes operated from properly
marked planes, which enabled their opponents to apply the principle of distinction. See Dinstein,
supra note 43, at 33 n.29.
160. Bin Laden’s statements also suggest that he rejects the war convention’s distinction between “collateral damage” and the deliberate attack of civilians. Deaths and other injuries suffered
by the Iraqi people as a consequence of the U.N. sanctions regime directed against the now-defunct
regime of Saddam Hussein should be morally (if not legally) equated, on this view, with deliberate
attacks on civilians: one justifies the other. While characteristic of apologies for terrorism of the
“one man’s freedom fighter is another man’s terrorist” variety, this logic constitutes an explicit repudiation of the war convention, which insists that IHL be observed equally and uniformly by all
combatants, regardless of the asserted justice of their casus belli.
161. See, e.g., Lee A. Casey & David B. Rivkin, Jr., Rethinking the Geneva Conventions, in
The Torture Debate in America, supra note 16, at 203; see also Wippman, supra note 34, at 10
(noting the “possibly quixotic nature of applying a body of law premised in part on considerations
of reciprocity to a conflict with terrorists whose principal aim is to kill civilians in violation of that
body of law”). But see Noah Feldman, Ugly Americans, in The Torture Debate in America,
supra note 16, at 267, 274–79 (pointing out serious rule of law, human rights, and instrumentalist
flaws in the nonreciprocity argument inherent in the Bush administration memoranda justifying
departures from the norms of the Geneva Conventions and the absolute prohibition of torture); Jinks,
supra note 24, at 190–95 (distinguishing various forms of reciprocity implicit in the Geneva Convention framework and, while noting that the Conventions create mutual obligations, debunking the
myth that they become inapplicable simply because the enemy does not or will not apply them
reciprocally).
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lack the hierarchical structure of traditional armies. NLMs typically operate
in or against a single state. Although they seldom fulfill the Brussels criteria
for lawful combatancy, they nevertheless tend to be centralized and hierarchical by contrast to the decentralized, nonhierarchical network structure of
transnational terrorist organizations. One expert characterized al-Qaeda’s
structure before the 2001 attack on Afghanistan, which eliminated its ability
to operate from a host state (at least for the moment), as follows:
It is neither a single group nor a coalition of groups: it comprised a core
base or bases in Afghanistan, satellite terrorist cells worldwide, a conglomerate of Islamist political parties, and other largely independent
terrorist groups that it draws on for offensive actions and other responsibilities. Leaders of all the above are co-opted as and when necessary to
serve as an integral part of Al Qaeda’s high command, which is run via a
vertical leadership structure that provides strategic direction and tactical
support to its horizontal network of compartmentalised cells and associate
162
organisations.

To speak of al-Qaeda as a univocal actor is therefore misleading; rather,
it “is simultaneously a small core group and a broader network linking vari163
ous Islamist groups and causes.”
It would be more accurate to
conceptualize the global war on terrorism as a fluctuating state of armed
hostilities with a transnational terrorist network that includes, but is not lim164
ited to, al-Qaeda, which itself must be disaggregated. The enemy in this
165
war is not one network; it is a loose “network of networks,” a series of
concentric circles, each comprising distinct actors, even if their agendas,
ideologies, and strategies frequently overlap.
Consider the paradigm of al-Qaeda. Within one circle is an inner core
“of highly skilled and dedicated members that has sworn loyalty to Osama
bin Laden and that has focused on terrorism,” numbering, according to some

162. Gunaratna, supra note 29, at 54. But cf. Philip Bobbitt, The Shield of Achilles
820 (2002) (enumerating features of the al-Qaeda network, including its standing army, treasury,
civil service, intelligence cadre, and welfare programs, which make it “a kind of virtual state”).
163. Daniel L. Byman, Al-Qaeda as an Adversary: Do We Understand Our Enemy?, 56
World Pol. 139, 149 (2003); see also Cuéllar, supra note 29, at 1317 (stressing “the dangers of
treating a terrorist network as a monolithic entity, impervious to organizational challenges, and
enjoying a bountiful supply of members guided by a single purpose”); Kimberly A. McCloud &
Adam Dolnik, Debunk the myth of Al Qaeda: Its size and reach have been blown out of proportion,
Christian Sci. Monitor, May 23, 2002 (“The United States and its allies in the war on terrorism
must defuse the widespread image of Al Qaeda as a ubiquitous, super-organized terror network and
call it as it is: a loose collection of groups and individuals that doesn’t even refer to itself as ‘Al
Qaeda.’ ”).
164. This is in fact how the Bush administration has tended to characterize the global war on
terrorism from its inception. See, e.g., Address Before a Joint Session of Congress on the United
States Response to the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2 Pub. Papers 1140, 1141 (Sept. 20,
2001) (“Our war on terror begins with al-Qaida, but it does not end there. It will not end until every
terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped, and defeated.”). On the other hand, the
administration apparently now acknowledges that “global war on terrorism” is not a legal term. See
John B. Bellinger, Remarks on the Military Commissions Act, 48 Harv. Int’l L.J. Online 1, 8
(2007), http://www.harvardilj.org/online/91 (last visited Sept. 2, 2007).
165.

Jason Burke, Al-Qaeda: Casting a Shadow of Terror 16 (2003).
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166

estimates, only in the hundreds. Then there exists an expanded circle of
perhaps 3000 elite al-Qaeda members, followed by another circle comprised
of anywhere from 10,000 to 110,000 fighters trained in the al-Qaeda camps
167
formerly based in Afghanistan. We might further break down this network
into circles of (1) individuals who profess allegiance to the avowed ideological goals of al-Qaeda or fealty to bin Laden but do not fall within alQaeda’s command structure; (2) self-declared subunits or followers of alQaeda such as the terrorist group led by the late Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in
Iraq; (3) “like-minded groups such as the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, and literally dozens of other radical
168
organizations;” (4) supporters who provide financial or other assistance;
169
and (5) potential recruits.
Determining the most accurate or helpful model by which to understand
the structure of modern transnational terrorist networks is extraordinarily
170
difficult. But the key point for IHL is the absence of a hierarchical military
structure. While the inner core of al-Qaeda apparently maintains a strict and
171
complex hierarchy, the real innovation of al-Qaeda, as the archetype of a
172
new genre of private army, is that “it is organized as a network.” Professional state armies and their cognates can achieve general compliance with
IHL because they are organized as hierarchies:
A hierarchy typically addresses the problems of organizing power, authority, administration, and governance by establishing a centralized and
coordinated decision-making headquarters. Typically hierarchies are built
around chains of command and animated by rituals and honors, duties and
privileges. To use the classic formula of Max Weber, the “charisma” of a
clan chief becomes routinized as a bureaucratically rational command-and-

166. Byman, supra note 163, at 149; see also Burke, supra note 165, at 13; Cuéllar, supra
note 29, at 1312 (“Though it is decentralized, it appears still to have a coherent leadership structure
and a cadre of strategic thinkers to chart its future course.”).
167.

Byman, supra note 163, at 148.

168. Id. at 149; see also Jonathan Schanzer, Al-Qaeda’s Armies (2005). Jason Burke
stresses that it is a mistake to conceive of al-Qaeda as “an international network of active groups
answering to bin Laden,” for while “they may see bin Laden as a heroic figure, symbolic of their
collective struggle, individuals and groups have their own leaders and their own agenda, often ones
that are deeply parochial and which they will not subordinate to those of bin Laden or his close
associates. Burke, supra note 165, at 14.
169. See Lawrence Wright, The Looming Tower 301–05 (2006) (describing the general
characteristics, training, and indoctrination of recruits in al-Qaeda’s former camps in Afghanistan).
170.

See Burke, supra note 165, at 15–22.

171.

See Gunaratna, supra note 162, at 57–60.

172. Barry Cooper, New Political Religions, or An Analysis of Modern Terrorism
158 (2004); see also Schanzer, supra note 168, at 22. Again, while the network structure of modern transnational terrorist networks typified by al-Qaeda differs both qualitatively and quantitatively
from past ones, it is not entirely new or unprecedented. In the extradition context, for example, U.S.
courts in the 1980s debated the relevance of such a network structure to the political offense exception. E.g., Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 776, 804 (9th Cir. 1986).
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control cadre at the top of which is a sovereign commander-in-chief utter173
ing the words, “I will it.”

By contrast, neither Osama bin Laden nor any other figurehead exercises
anything like this plenary power: “Bin Laden does not have the power to
issue orders that are instantly obeyed. He is not the commander-in-chief of
an army. In fact, any military analogies, despite the martial-sounding names
assumed by many Islamic groups, are unhelpful in understanding their na174
ture.” Even were al-Qaeda inclined to adhere to certain aspects of IHL, its
network structure renders the authoritative transmission, internalization, and
175
enforcement of IHL rules and principles impracticable.
Two further consequences follow from this structure. The first concerns
the potential for negotiation to neutralize the threat posed by modern transnational terrorist networks. While animated by overlapping ideologies and
goals, the networks against which the global war on terrorism is fought lack
a single, charismatic chief with the authority and credibility required for
negotiation. It is difficult enough to identify and understand al-Qaeda’s di176
verse grievances and demands, although it should be stressed that they
177
tend to be political rather than cultural. But in any event, bin Laden is not
the consensus, anointed negotiator on behalf of one “party” to the armed
conflict in which al-Qaeda participates. Various components of modern
transnational terrorist networks differ in their grievances and demands.
Some seek to reestablish the Caliphate or a pure version of Islam identified
178
with some idealized past; others maintain culturally, politically, and geographically specific demands.
Again, I do not want to suggest that negotiation will never be effective
and should be abandoned. It remains an indispensable strategy in some cir173.

Cooper, supra note 172, at 160.

174. Burke, supra note 165, at 16. Cf. Gunaratna, supra note 162, at 56–57 (“By issuing
periodic pronouncements, speeches and writings, Osama [bin Laden] indoctrinates, trains and controls a core inner group as well as inspiring and supporting peripheral cadres. . . . The constituent
groups of Al Qaeda operate as a loose coalition, each with its own command, control and communications structures.”).
175. Stephen Holmes, Is Defiance of Law a Proof of Success? Magical Thinking in the War on
Terror, in The Torture Debate in America, supra note 16, at 118, 130.
176. Bin Laden specifically enumerated the grievances on the basis of which, he said, alQaeda has attacked the United States. See Messages to the World, supra note 143, at 16–72; see
also 9/11 Comm’n Report, supra note 23, at 51; Wright, supra note 169, at 247; Byman, supra
note 163, at 144–45; Osama bin Laden, Statement to America (October 26, 2002), reproduced in
Osama bin Laden: America’s Enemy in His Own Words 94–103 (Randall B. Hamud ed., 2005).
177. See George Michael, The Enemy of My Enemy 260 (2006); Byman, supra note 163,
at 145; Christopher M. Blanchard, Cong. Research Serv., Al Qaeda: Statements and
Evolving Ideology (2007); see also Pape, supra note 33, at 102–25.
178. 9/11 Comm’n Report, supra note 23, at 50–51; Schanzer, supra note 168, at 15; W.
Michael Reisman, Aftershocks: Reflections on the Implications of September 11, 6 Yale Hum. Rts.
& Dev. L.J. 81, 85 (2003). Sayyid Qutb, one of the most influential intellectual forebears of radical
Islamic organizations like al-Qaeda, sought to purge Islam of the corruption of modern (Western)
values, Wright, supra note 169, at 24, and restore its pervasive role in every aspect of social and
political life. See, e.g., Sayed Kotb, Social Justice in Islam 113–26, 261–62 (John B. Hardie
trans., Octagon Books 1970) (1953).
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cumstances, particularly to address discrete issues and grievances such as,
for example, the status of Kashmir. But the diffuse nature of modern transnational terrorism—the diversity of grievances and demands made by
various network components and the absence of a single, authoritative
leader with the power to ensure compliance with bargains struck—means
179
negotiation will be at best a partial solution and, not infrequently, futile.
The second consequence that follows from the structure of modern
transnational terrorist networks concerns deterrence and reciprocity. The
strategic logic of classical deterrence is, many argue, dubious at best relative
to a diffuse transnational terrorist network. Like a hydra, it cannot be de180
181
capitated. It has “a robust capacity for regeneration.” And it lacks a
182
readily ascertainable “return address.” Ideological objectives and religious
beliefs held by some members of these networks exacerbate the deterrence
problem, for it is difficult to deter those who regard death in the service of
183
ideology as preferable to life —a mindset that al-Qaeda deliberately culti184
vates. Modern IHL depends on both internal self-enforcement through
normative commitments shared with international human rights law and
external enforcement through the political dynamics that obtain between
states, as well as, perhaps, some nonstate actors such as the NLMs that aspire to statehood. But because one side in the global war on terrorism
repudiates the paramount normative convention of the law of war, namely, a
particular conception of noncombatant immunity, IHL must fall back on the
179. Ideological views held by certain transnational terrorist networks may also render negotiation untenable to their members, for “there can be no bargaining with the infidel enemy: God, not
the umma, and certainly not Al Qaeda, is the offended party.” Cooper, supra note 172, at 173; see
also 9/11 Comm’n Report, supra note 23, at 362 (“[Bin Laden and his allies do not espouse] a
position with which Americans can bargain or negotiate. . . . [T]here is no common ground—not
even respect for life—on which to begin a dialogue.”); Berman, supra note 139, at 116. Note, however, that bin Laden has explicitly offered to strike “deals” on several occasions, though the
credibility of such offers is suspect. See, e.g., Osama bin Laden, Offer of Peace Treaty With Europe
(Apr. 15, 2004) reprinted in Osama bin Laden: America’s Enemy in His Own Words, supra note
176, at 156–159; Osama bin Laden, Second Statement to the American People (Oct. 29, 2004),
reprinted in Osama bin Laden: America’s Enemy in His Own Words, supra note 176, at 160–66.
Furthermore, to the extent that the demands made imply the sacrifice of core international human
rights, negotiation may be not only impracticable but normatively untenable from the perspective of
international law. Reisman, supra note 178, at 85, 90–94; Cf. Michael Walzer, Terrorism: A Critique of Excuses, in Arguing About War 51 (2004).
180.

Cooper, supra note 172, at 165.

181.

Gunaratna, supra note 162, at 54.

182.

Graham, supra note 45, at 9; Reisman, supra note 45, at 86.

183. See, e.g., Bobbitt, supra note 162, at 820 (“Al Qaeda is a kind of virtual state, which
means that our classical strategies of deterrence based on retaliation will have to be rethought.”);
Wedgwood, supra note 141, at 110 (“[D]eterrence cannot work when a non-State actor is unencumbered by worldly commitments, when it lacks any commitment to a people or a territory, and seeks
only supernatural reward.”). But see Matthew & Shambaugh, supra note 44; Trager & Zagorcheva,
supra note 44.
184. Gunaratna, supra note 162, at 72–73. Osama bin Laden has reportedly said that “ ‘We
love death . . . as much as the infidels love life.’ ” Fouad Ajami, Facing Up to Unholy Terror, U.S.
News & World Rep., Sept. 20, 2004, at 31. By contrast, deterrence in the broader sense of strategies to confront the causes and grievances, legitimate or not, of modern transnational terrorist
networks remains practicable and, in my judgment, essential.
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external enforcement dynamics of deterrence and reciprocity. Yet for the
reasons just sketched, these dynamics, too, will be unlikely to function relative to a “network of networks.” This might not have been such a major
problem in the past because, as Michael Reisman wrote in the ad bellum
context, “[a]s long as nonstate actors did not amass significant arsenals,
their indifference or even hostility to world public order was inconsequen185
tial.” But transnational terrorist networks now operate in a global order
186
characterized by massive weapons proliferation on illicit markets. Many
experts believe that absent reinvigorated transnational efforts to avoid such a
nightmare scenario, it is only a matter of time before catastrophic, including
187
nuclear, weapons fall into the hands of nonstate actors willing to use them.
IV. Prologue to a Voluntarist War Convention
Despite the alarming tone of these observations, the existence of a new
paradigm, as stressed at the outset of this Article, must be distinguished
from particular policies allegedly adopted in response to it. Whether a new
paradigm exists and whether it renders the old one obsolete are analytically
188
distinct questions. Insofar as modern transnational terrorist networks repudiate the amoral conception of noncombatant immunity and exhibit a
nonhierarchical, “network of networks” structure, contemporary IHL is illsuited to address armed conflicts with them. At the same time, we should be
wary of exaggeration about the nature and extent of the threat posed by this
189
new paradigm and the state measures required to guard against it. Gonzales
wrote that the “new paradigm” differs from “the traditional clash between
190
nations adhering to the laws of war.” But as the discussion of Protocol I
indicates, this is hardly the first time that IHL has been called upon to adapt
to new circumstances. Well before the attacks of September 11, 2001, the
“traditional clash between nations adhering to the laws of war” had become
191
the exception rather than the rule. Neither the nonstate actor in general nor

185.

Reisman, supra note 45, at 86.

186. Naím, supra note 47, at 38–64; see also Gordon Corera, Shopping for Bombs: Nuclear Proliferation, Global Insecurity, and the Rise and Fall of the A.Q. Khan
Network 161–64 (2006).
187. See, e.g., Graham Allison, Nuclear Terrorism (2004). But see Dafna Linzer, Nuclear
Capabilities May Elude Terrorists, Experts Say, Wash. Post, Dec. 29, 2004, at A1.
188. Cf. Brooks, supra note 16, at 745 (“[T]o say that the administration’s interpretations of
the laws of armed conflict are plausible is neither to support the policy decisions that underlie the
choice of legal paradigms, nor to accept as inevitable or appropriate all of the consequences that
flow from this choice.”).
189. Cf. John Mueller, Is There Still a Terrorist Threat? The Myth of the Omnipresent Enemy,
Foreign Aff., Sept./Oct. 2006, at 2, 8 .
190.

Gonzales Memorandum, supra note 25.

191. Indeed, “even the battles of the nineteenth century,” and certainly those of the latter half
of the twentieth century, “rarely fit this paradigm.” Brooks, supra note 16, at 730.
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192

the terrorist in particular is new to IHL. States have previously struggled
with the question how to integrate them into the global war system. Gonzales’s reference to a new paradigm, however, might charitably be understood
to refer not to nonstate actors or terrorists generally but instead to the distinctive threat posed by modern transnational terrorist networks operating in
a global environment in which catastrophic weapons formerly monopolized
by states are increasingly available to nonstate actors on illicit markets.
The principal purpose of this Article has been to clarify the respects in
which the new paradigm is genuinely new, to stress the challenges posed by
modern transnational terrorist networks for IHL, and to point out the need
for IHL to define the contours of a voluntarist war convention that can effectively and humanely govern what is likely to be a prolonged state of
episodic armed conflict with this particular genre of twenty-first-century
193
nonstate actor. I want to conclude, however, by suggesting that (1) any
modifications to the law should be incremental, transparent, and tentative;
(2) the burden of persuasion should be on those who would modify IHL;
and (3) in the meantime, insofar as existing IHL does not clearly apply,
sound policy nonetheless continues to commend adherence to the core precepts of the inherited war convention.
To articulate principles of IHL appropriate for war with transnational
terrorist networks typified by al-Qaeda, state political elites must first un194
derstand their nature. In view of the Manichean political rhetoric, it is
embarrassingly apparent that many do not. For example, that high-level intelligence agents, law-enforcement officials, and many members of
Congress, including key lawmakers involved in crucial decisions about matters of national security related to the global war on terrorism, do not know
the difference between Shia and Sunni Islam and cannot identify al-Qaeda
with a particularly militant and reactionary ideology embraced by some ad195
herents of the latter is deeply disturbing. It is hardly an apology for
terrorism to acknowledge that “[i]f we are to reduce the extent of terrorist

192. As early as 1937, international law recognized and sought to address terrorism as a distinct phenomenon. See Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism, Nov. 16, 1937,
19 L.N.T.S. 23; see generally Antonio Cassese, Terrorism as an International Crime, in Enforcing
International Law Norms Against Terrorism 213 (Andrea Bianchi ed., 2004); Thomas M.
Franck & Bert B. Lockwood, Jr., Preliminary Thoughts Towards an International Convention on
Terrorism, 68 Am. J. Int’l L. 69 (1974); Ben Saul, The Legal Response of the League of Nations to
Terrorism, 4 J. Int’l Crim. Just. 78 (2006). Terrorism itself, of course, predates by centuries legal
efforts to address it at the international level. One famous example is the Hashashin or Assassins, a
radical Ismaili Muslim sect active in the eighth through fourteenth centuries. See generally Farhad
Daftary, The Isma’ilis (1990); Bernard Lewis, The Assassins (2002).
193.

See High-Level Panel, A More Secure World, supra note 23, ¶ 146.

194. E.g., Remarks Following Discussions With Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi of Japan
and an Exchange With Reporters, 2 Pub. Papers 1157, 1159 (Sept. 25, 2001) (“And make no mistake about it: This is good versus evil. These are evildoers. They have no justification for their
actions. There’s no religious justification, there’s no political justification. The only motivation is
evil.”).
195.

Jeff Stein, Can You Tell a Sunni from a Shi’ite?, N.Y. Times, Oct. 17, 2006, at A21.
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violence aimed at us, we must consider the root causes of that terror, and
196
seek ways to address it.”
I doubt that we understand adequately the nature and psychology of the
enemy—which is not one enemy, but many—in the new paradigm of armed
197
conflict with transnational terrorist networks. Nor does the rise of a new
paradigm necessarily supersede, as opposed to augment, the older, more
conventional ones. Blanket verdicts about the obsolescence of the Geneva
Conventions or any other component of the inherited postwar IHL would
198
therefore be premature and likely misguided. The war convention may
199
need to be adapted, but it should not be discarded. Ultimately, rather than
fit the square peg of the global war on terrorism into the round hole of the
existing law, IHL may well need to develop a lex specialis for conflicts with
transnational terrorist networks, just as it did (albeit with limited success)
for the noninternational conflicts of the latter half of the twentieth century.
Geoffrey Corn proposes, for example, that IHL recognize a new category of
“transnational armed conflict,” which would apply to “the extraterritorial
application of military combat power by the regular armed forces of a state
200
against a transnational non-state armed enemy.” In the meantime, however, for instrumental and moral reasons alike, the burden of persuasion
should be on those who suggest significant departures from the spirit, if not
the letter, of the inherited laws of war.
First, even from a purely instrumentalist perspective, it is far too simple
to dismiss the inherited body of IHL because al-Qaeda and comparable
201
groups do not “fight fair” or “play by the rules.” Of course, reciprocity
will be unlikely to encourage IHL compliance by modern transnational terrorist networks in a contractual sense, whereby parties to an armed conflict
comply with IHL principally to ensure reciprocal compliance by their enemies and to avoid reprisals, which might be characterized as reciprocal
breaches of a contractual war convention authorized by a precedent breach.
But IHL compliance, even in the absence of contractual reciprocity, continues to serve several vital state and individual interests.
196. David Cole, Enemy Aliens: Double Standards and Constitutional Freedoms in
the War on Terrorism 205 (2003).
197. See generally Marc Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks (2004); Terrorists, Victims and Society, supra note 33. Cuéllar, while acknowledging the diffuse, network
structure of modern transnational terrorist organizations, argues that undue rhetorical emphasis on
the trope of decentralization obscures the extent to which terrorist networks face bureaucratic challenges not unlike those of the modern administrative state. Cuéllar, supra note 29, at 1307–10.
198. See, e.g., Casey & Rivkin, supra note 161, at 203–04; cf. John C. Yoo & Will Trachman,
Less Than Bargained For: The Use of Force and the Declining Relevance of the United Nations, 5
Chi. J. Int’l L. 379, 379–85 (2005) (advancing comparable arguments vis-à-vis the jus ad bellum).
199.
(2006).
200.

E.g., Renée de Nevers, Modernizing the Geneva Conventions, 29 Wash. Q. 99, 100
Corn, Regulation of Hostilities, supra note 26, at 299–300.

201. Feldman, supra note 161, at 276–79. Whether the Geneva Conventions formally apply,
as a matter of existing positive law, is a distinct issue. Derek Jinks argues persuasively that the absence of a robust reciprocity dynamic does not obviate the legal applicability of the Conventions.
Jinks, supra note 24, at 190–95.
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In the first place, the infliction of superfluous suffering generally “yields
no military advantage and may have the undesirable effect of stimulating
hatred in the enemy. . . . Excessive destruction not only violates humanitarian considerations but is not good practice from a military operational
202
standpoint.” In the context of the global war on terrorism, for example,
violations of IHL often contribute to a perception of the United States and
its allies that swells the ranks of new recruits for transnational terrorist net203
works. Second, as Telford Taylor stressed, the laws of war serve an
essential psychological purpose insofar as they “diminish the corrosive ef204
fect of mortal combat on the participants”; put otherwise, “limitations
imposed on the conduct of hostilities—limitations developed by warriors to
limit the infliction of suffering to only that which is legitimately necessary—protect not just the adversary, but the moral and psychological
205
integrity of the members of the force regulated by such constraints.” In a
related vein, as early as 1880, in the Oxford Manual of the Laws of War on
Land, military elites recognized that compliance with the laws of war serves
not only humanitarian objectives but also, as a general rule, the interests of
belligerents: compliance contributes to the discipline and efficacy of mili206
tary forces.
Finally, contractual reciprocity does not tell the whole story. Recall, in
this context, the definitional distinction between formal and informal conventions emphasized at the outset of this Article as well as the diverse
prudential, virtue ethicist, and humanitarian roots of past war conventions.
Relative to transnational terrorist networks, the analysis supplied above suggests that we lack one sort of instrumentalist reason to comply with formal
conventions: the expectation that compliance will induce reciprocal compliance. But it does not follow that we therefore lack any instrumentalist—not
to mention moral or humanitarian—rationale to adhere to the informal conventions that underwrite those treaties. To the contrary:
[R]eciprocity is almost always more than bilateral. . . . Reciprocity extends
also to my desire to convince other parties, third parties, that agreements
are worth keeping, even when such parties might be able to get away with
violating them. Just as important, reciprocity includes the proposition that I

202. Roberts, supra note 89, at 119; Jinks, supra note 24, at 191 (“[H]umane and fair treatment increases battlefield effectiveness because poor treatment discourages surrender, encourages
reprisals, decreases troop morale, and decreases political support at home and abroad for the war
effort.”).
203. Human Rights Watch, World Report 2003, at xvii (2003) (“Washington’s tendency
to ignore human rights in fighting terrorism is not only disturbing in its own right; it is dangerously
counter-productive. The smoldering resentment it breeds risks generating terrorist recruits, puts off
potential anti-terrorism allies, and weakens efforts to curb terrorist atrocities.”); see also Shirley
Williams, The seeds of Iraq’s future terror: Free market shock therapy must not be imposed by the
occupiers, Guardian, Oct. 28, 2003, at 22.
204.

Taylor, supra note 72, at 40.

205.

Corn, Filling the Void, supra note 26, at 484–85.

206.

Corn, Regulation of Hostilities, supra note 26, at 318.
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have an interest to signal that I am the kind of person or entity who keeps
agreements in spirit as well as in letter.
The rule of law, understood from this perspective of reciprocal interest in
keeping to the rules, is not only a good in itself. It is also a tool for promot207
ing a habit of rule-following that serves the interests of stability.

By viewing reciprocity solely as a short-term, utilitarian device for securing compliance with IHL rules in particular circumstances, we neglect
the aggregate, systemic effects of real and perceived violations of IHL on
the stability of the international legal and political system as well as our ef208
ficacy as a state actor within it. The global war on terrorism will not be
won solely by millitary force or even primarily by that strategic instru209
ment. Chronic violations of the spirit, if not the letter, of the law, even if
they appear to promise short-term gains, tend in the long term to undermine
a state’s credibility and reputation with unforeseeable, but predictably negative, consequences for its ability to pursue diplomatic, intelligence,
ideological, and other strategies that will be indispensable to its national
security. Compliance with the core precepts of the war convention therefore
tends to serve the strategic objectives of states engaged in the global conflict
with modern transnational terrorist networks. Empirical evidence or a particularly compelling argument may show that this is not the case relative to a
given IHL rule. But for these reasons, as well as humanitarian considerations, the burden of persuasion should be on those who urge departures from
the existing war convention to show that actual, not speculative, military
necessity requires them, even if the letter of law in a particular case is subject to a contrary, but plausible, interpretation. Indeed, it is telling that for
more than three decades before the advent of the global war on terrorism,
and despite the absence of contractual reciprocity in earlier armed conflicts
(for example, the Vietnam War), the Department of Defense Law of War
Program saw fit to adopt, in effect, a voluntarist war convention as a matter
210
of policy. It directs the U.S. armed forces to “comply with the law of war

207.

Feldman, supra note 161, at 277.

208. Furthermore, because the network of networks against which the global war on terrorism
is fought cannot be conceived of as a monolithic actor with a vertical command structure, it is less
important than it might at first appear that the incentive structures of key public figures—Osama bin
Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri, and so forth—cannot be influenced by the dynamics of reciprocity.
While the use of torture as a tactic of interrogation should be prohibited for humanitarian, pragmatic, and moral reasons, see David Luban, Liberalism, Torture, and the Ticking Bomb, 91 Va. L.
Rev. 1425, 1440–52 (2005); Jeremy Waldron, Torture and Positive Law: Jurisprudence for the
White House, 105 Colum. L. Rev. 1681, 1682–1717 (2005), the diffuse, network structure of modern transnational terrorism also makes it less likely that detainees will possess actionable
intelligence on imminent attacks. See, e.g., Gunaratna, supra note 162, at 76 (“Cell members
never meet in one place together; nor do they in fact know each other; nor are they familiar with the
means of communication used between the cell leader and each of its members.” (footnote omitted)).
209.

See High-Level Panel, A More Secure World, supra note 23, ¶¶ 147–48.

210.

Corn, Regulation of Hostilities, supra note 26, at 315.
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during all armed conflicts, however such conflicts are characterized, and in
211
all other military operations.”
Moreover, from a moral perspective, nothing about the global conflict
with modern transnational terrorist networks offers any reason to depart
from the broadly shared normative objective of IHL: to limit suffering, destruction, and violations of human dignity to the greatest extent practicable
in war. IHL signifies a major postwar shift in the modern law of armed conflict: away from an interstate model grounded solely in simple reciprocity
and interstate dynamics and toward a model justified more explicitly by international human rights law’s solicitude for the individual and normative
commitment to a universal conception of human dignity. To this effect, the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia aptly noted:
After the First World War, the application of the laws of war moved away
from a reliance on reciprocity between belligerents, with the consequence
that, in general, rules came to be increasingly applied by each belligerent
despite their possible disregard by the enemy. The underpinning of this
shift was that it became clear to States that norms of international humanitarian law were not intended to protect State interests; they were primarily
212
designed to benefit individuals qua human beings.

Potential changes to the convention that threaten to diminish its protection of human dignity should therefore be made transparently, with caution,
and based on compelling evidence of the actual necessity for departures
from the old one, not speculation based on hyperbolic “ticking bomb” scenarios and the like. The Martens Clause, though often viewed as merely
hortatory, embodies vital humanitarian ideals that lie at the moral core of
IHL. As a matter of law, it prescribes a kind of “precautionary principle” for
IHL comparable to the axiom of international environmental law, which,
among other things, puts the burden of proof on those who advocate conduct
that could seriously damage the environment:
Until a more complete code of the laws of war is issued, the High Contracting Parties think it right to declare that in cases not included in the
Regulations adopted by them, populations and belligerents remain under
the protection and empire of the principles of international law, as they result from the usages established between civilized nations, from the laws
213
of humanity and the requirements of the public conscience . . . .

None of this is to dismiss the very real dangers posed by transnational
terrorist networks operating in a global environment in which catastrophic
211. Directive No. 2311.01E: DoD Law of War Program, ¶ 5.3.1 (Dep’t of Def. May 9, 2006).
I am grateful to Geoffrey Corn for directing my attention to this policy.
212. Prosecutor v. Kupreškić, Case No. IT-95-16-T, Judgment, ¶ 518 (Jan. 14, 2000) (footnote
omitted).
213. 1899 Hague Convention, supra note 53, pbml. The Martens Clause, named for its drafter,
Baron Feodor de Martens, Czar Nicholas II’s legal adviser, first appeared in the preamble to the
1899 Hague Convention. It has since been reproduced, substantially unchanged, in the 1949 Geneva
Conventions and the Additional Protocols of 1977. Geneva Convention (III), supra note 63, art. 142;
Protocol I, supra note 37, art. 1(2).
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weapons have become increasingly available to nonstate actors. It is, however, to suggest again that the burden of persuasion properly lies on those
214
who urge departures from the core precepts of the war convention, espe215
cially the minima of humane treatment prescribed by Common Article 3,
216
as augmented by customary international law. Absent a compelling showing that military necessity not adequately taken into account by existing IHL
requires a departure, these considerations weigh strongly in favor of adherence to the core precepts of the war convention even where existing positive
law may plausibly be subject to a contrary interpretation.
Conclusion
That said, in the long term, the increasingly anachronistic postwar
framework supplied by the Geneva Conventions, as augmented by the Additional Protocols of 1977 and customary international law, will not, in my
judgment, suffice to address the diverse challenges to IHL posed by modern
217
transnational terrorist networks. The global war on terrorism has already
raised legal quandaries about, for example, the potential for indefinite deten-

214. Cf. Brooks, supra note 16, at 751–52 (arguing, relative to the targeted assassination of alQaeda suspects in Yemen by a U.S. predator drone missile in 2002 that given the circumstances and
uncertainties, “human rights norms suggest that the U.S. should bear the burden (politically and
diplomatically, if not legally) of making a convincing case that the killings were neither arbitrary nor
unnecessary”).
215. For all noninternational armed conflicts, Common Article 3 provides in relevant part:
Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of armed forces who have
laid down their arms and those placed hors de combat by sickness, wounds, detention, or any
other cause, shall in all circumstances be treated humanely, without any adverse distinction
founded on race, colour, religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any other similar criteria.

Geneva Convention (III), supra note 63, art. 3. It forbids “violence to life and person”; hostagetaking; torture; cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment; and “the passing of sentences and the
carrying out of executions without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court
affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples.” Id.
It also requires that state parties collect and care for the wounded and sick. Id.
216. Article 75 of Protocol I, though technically applicable only in international armed conflicts, is regarded by many, including the United States, as customary international law, and it
informs the content of Common Article 3. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2797 (2006)
(plurality opinion); see also Geoffrey S. Corn, Hamdan, Fundamental Fairness, and the Significance
of Additional Protocol II, 2006 Army Law. 1, 5; Taft, supra note 131, at 321–22. Equally, Article 6
of Protocol II, while not strictly applicable to the conflict with al-Qaeda or the global war on terrorism according to the terms of Article 1(1), may inform the content of Common Article 3. See Corn,
supra, at 7. See generally 1 Customary International Humanitarian Law 299–383 (JeanMarie Henckaerts & Louise Doswald-Beck eds., 2005). Insofar as state parties have not derogated
from it, Article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights should also apply. See
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 14, opened for signature Dec. 16, 1966, S.
Exec. Doc. No. E, 95-2 (1978), 999 U.N.T.S. 171.
217. For arguments that the current framework suffices, see, for example, Jordan J. Paust,
Am. Soc’y Int’l Law, There is No Need to Revise the Laws of War in Light of September
11th (2002), available at http://www.asil.org/taskforce/paust.pdf; Luigi Condorelli & Yasmin
Naqvi, The War Against Terrorism and Jus in Bello: Are the Geneva Conventions Out of Date?, in
Enforcing International Law Norms Against Terrorism 25 (Andrea Bianchi ed., 2004); and
Paust, supra note 90.
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218

tion, the lawfulness of intermittent armed attacks in the territory of other
219
(nonenemy) sovereign states, the due process and trial rights of unprivi220
221
leged belligerents, and the legality of targeted assassinations. And
notwithstanding the laudable humanitarian goals of modern IHL, it should
always be remembered that no war convention will long survive—to the
detriment of those very same laudable goals—unless belligerents operating
in good faith accept that it can be applied in a manner consistent with the
genuine demands of military necessity and long-term national security.
In time, IHL will need to work out the details of a voluntarist war convention to govern what is likely to be a prolonged state of episodic armed
conflict with modern, diffuse transnational terrorist networks typified by al222
Qaeda. Those details lie beyond the scope of this Article and in any event
should, as emphasized, be developed incrementally, cautiously, and transparently as empirical evidence and deliberation clarify the genuine demands
223
of military necessity in the twenty-first century. At an abstract level, however, any voluntarist war convention should be guided by two overarching
considerations. It must suffice to preserve minimum order both globally and
within liberal states, for without a certain level of security and freedom from
fear, those states will be unlikely to survive in anything like their present
224
form. And it must be humane, as measured against the shared international
conceptions of human dignity and rights that have been rightly acknowledged as laudable hallmarks of the postwar international legal order. A
voluntarist war convention suitable to the new paradigm will not, in this
225
particular regard, be so new.

218. E.g., A. v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t, [2004] UKHL 56, (2005) 2 A.C. 68 (H.L.)
(appeal taken from Eng.) (U.K.) (holding that indefinite detention of foreign terrorist suspects is
incompatible with the U.K. Human Rights Act and the European Convention on Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms); see also Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 519–21 (2004) (eliding the
issue by focusing on the continuation of hostilities in Afghanistan).
219. E.g., Walter Pincus, U.S. Strike Kills Six in Al Qaeda: Missile Filed by Predator Drone,
Wash. Post, Nov. 5, 2002, at A1.
220. See, e.g., Thomas M. Franck, Criminals, Combatants, or What? An Examination of the
Role of Law in Responding to the Threat of Terror, 98 Am. J. Int’l L. 686, 687 (2004).
221. See HCJ 769/02 Pub. Comm. Against Torture in Israel v. Israel, Dec. 14, 2006 (sustaining the policy of targeted assassinations under some circumstances); see also Michael Ignatieff,
Lesser Evils: What it Will Cost Us to Succeed in the War on Terror, N.Y. Times, May 2, 2004, § 6
(Magazine), at 49–50.
222. For better or worse, the probability of a new international conference to address these
issues, such as those convened in the past to address the changing nature of warfare, is low. See
Wippman, supra note 34, at 6, 11–13.
223. Specific proposals include, for example, recognizing and elaborating the IHL rules and
regulations for a hybrid category of “transnational armed conflict,” Corn, Regulation of Hostilities,
supra note 26, at 53, and eliminating the distinction between internal and international armed conflicts; revising the criteria for lawful combatancy; and entrenching certain minimal due process
rights for all detainees, regardless of their status under IHL, Brooks, supra note 16, at 755–60.
224. See Scheffler, supra note 22, at 4–6 (“[T]he fear that is generated by terrorism can lead
to significant changes in the character of society and the quality of daily life, and at the extremes
these changes can destabilize a government or even the social order as a whole.”).
225.

See Dinstein, supra note 43, at 16–17.

